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Abstract
In this paper we develop a technique for proving determinacy of classes of the
form ω2 - Π11 + Γ (a refinement of the difference hierarchy on Π
1
1 lying between
ω2 - Π11 and (ω
2 + 1) - Π11) from weak principles, establishing upper bounds for
the determinacy-strength of the classes ω2 - Π11 + Σ
0
α for all computable α and
of ω2 - Π11 + ∆
1
1. This bridges the gap between previously known hypotheses
implying determinacy in this region.
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1. Introduction
We work towards proving the following theorem (the relevant definitions can
be found in the next section):
Theorem 1.1. If there exists a non-trivial mouse M with measurable cardinal
κ satisfying the theory T , then Det(ω2 - Π11 + Γ) for the following combinations
of T and Γ:
1. T = “cleverness + there exists a clever mouse,” Γ = Σ01;
2. T = KP + Σ1 -, Γ = Σ
0
2;
3. T = Σ2 -KP + Σ2 -, Γ = Σ
0
3;
4. T = Σn+1 -KP + Σn+1 -, Γ = n - Π
0
3;
5. T = ZFC− + Pα(κ) exists, Γ = Σ01+α+3 for computable α;
6. T = ZFC, Γ = ∆11.
This is thus an extension of ω2 - Π11 determinacy, without requiring all the
strength of 0† required to prove determinacy of (ω2 + 1) - Π11. The story of
Det(ω2 - Π11) starts with Martin proving in [10] that the existence of a measur-
able cardinal implies the determinacy of Π11. The proof uses the measure to
“integrate” many strategies together in a technique that proved very fruitful
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and which makes the core of the present paper. Analysis of the proof allows the
result to be broken down to the following:
Theorem (Martin).
∀x ∈ ωω(x] exists→ Det(Π11(x))).
Hence 0] implies the determinacy of the lightface co-analytic sets. Here the
role of the measure is seen through the lens of indiscernibility, and this is the
form in which our determinacy proof will be.
It was then shown in [5] that actually 0] implies Det(3 - Π11), the third level
of the difference hierarchy. Eventually the full strength of 0] came out in a proof
by Martin (available in Martin’s unpublished book manuscript [9] or an account
by DuBose [4]) that
Theorem (Martin).
0] exists↔ Det (⋃α<ω2α - Π11) .
The much stronger principle of 0† was found to imply Det((ω2 + 1) - Π11),
and indeed this is an exact equivalence. Intermediate results were sought;
in [11] Martin proves Det(ω2 - Π11) from a measurable cardinal and, provid-
ing inspiration for our current results, proves Det(∆(ω2 + 1) - Π11) and hence
Det(ω2 - Π11 + ∆
1
1) from the same hypothesis. Nonetheless a weaker hypothesis
was sought and found in [15], the paper on which this is based:
Theorem (Welch). There exists a clever mouse iff Det(ω2 - Π11).
A clever mouse is a certain type of iterable model. Principles such as 0] and
0† can be viewed in terms of mice, as well, so this result in some sense exists on
the same continuum.
The difference hierarchy is already a refinement of the projective hierarchy,
here, so we consider further refinements; if Γ ⊆ Π11 is a pointclass, ω2 - Π11 + Γ is
viewed as (ω2+1) - Π11 with the final set in the ω
2+1-sequence being constrained
to being Γ. Using the methods in [15], we find that such results are closely
connected to the determinacy of a class related to Γ which we call Γ˜. This is the
analogue of Γ in a larger space, arising from the auxiliary game used in Section
4 , and in Section 2.2 we will spend some time developing the theory of this
space.
The way we will prove Theorem 1.1 is via the following:
Theorem 1.2. Let Γ be an arithmetic pointclass. Suppose there exists a class
C of Σn generating indiscernibles for a theory T such that for any ~c ∈ [C]ω, any
Γ˜ game has a Σn-definable winning strategy in the smallest transitive model of
T with ~c ∈ T . Then Det(ω2 - Π11 + Γ).
We will define exactly what generating indiscernibles are in Section 3, where
we will also show their existence, and Theorem 1.2 will be proved in Section
2
4, where Γ˜ will be defined implicitly. Finally in Section 5 we will prove the
determinacy of Γ˜ for each Γ mentioned in 1.1 in the relevant model.
Section 2.1 contains definitions of the difference hierarchy and our refine-
ments to it, as well as some small lemmas that help in establishing the determi-
nacy of dual classes. Readers familiar with the difference hierarchy may wish to
skip that section except for the main Definition 2.2. Section 2.2 contains essen-
tial definitions required to complete the determinacy proofs, but the material
closely mirrors the usual effective descriptive set theory. Sections 3 and 4 are
independent of one another and can be read in either order, with the exception
of Definition 3.1.
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2. Preliminaries
Our set theoretic notation is standard, and we follow [9] for our determinacy
notation. Thus a game is specified by a game-tree T , usually ω<ω, and the
payoff set A ⊆ dT e. dT e is the set of all possible plays, and is equal to [T ], the
set of branches, if T has no terminal-nodes, which for us will always be the case.
Determinacy for a class of sets Γ is denoted Det(Γ). The Borel hierarchy and
co-analytic sets in the space [T ] are defined as usual as in [13], but since we will
be dealing with small models without all of the reals we will need to use the
lightface counterparts of these classes. In Section 2.2 this will be generalised to
uncountable T ; once the basic definitions are in order, the results here work the
same as in the classical case.
We require familiarity with admissible structures and L, where we follow the
notation of [2]. We will also use the Jensen hierarchy Jα, but since we mostly
deal with admissible structures this can be thought of as Lα. KPn denotes the
axioms of Kripke-Platek set theory augmented by the schemes of Σn Collection
and Separation. We make extensive use of structures of the form 〈Lα[A],∈, A〉
for some predicate A (usually a countable sequence of ordinals.) If we say a
structure of this form is admissible, or a model of KPn, we mean a model in
said theory in the language with a predicate for A, adjusting the Le´vy hierarchy
appropriately. Most results from the usual Lα hierarchy generalise in the obvious
way; in particular we will need Σn Skolem functions for n > 1. Normally this
would require the full fine structure theory, but we will always be in a model of
at least Σn−1 admissibility. Thus we will freely make use of the fact that “the
M -least set x such that ϕ(x)” for ϕ a Σn formula is Σn over M .
While the statement of Theorem 1.1 is in terms of mice, we won’t need much
mouse theory at all, since the mice we use will be models of enough set theory
to obviate the need for much of the fine structure theory. The important part
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of being a mouse is the property of iterability, i.e. having wellfounded iterated
ultrapowers. Thus when we talk of M being a mouse the important features
that we will use are its transitivity and wellfounded ultrapowers, and indeed
the hypotheses of the main theorem could just as well be stated in terms of the
existence of any transitive, iterable model of enough set theory. The full theory
can be found in [18], but we will only need the theory for mice with a single
measure, which can be found (albeit with older notation) in [3].
Also touched upon in section 3 is the canonical mouse order, <∗, the details
of which are not important for this paper.
For the first result of the main theorem we refer to the cleverness property
defined in [15] that was the key to getting that paper’s main result. Essentially
this is a version of Rowbottom’s theorem for classes Σ1-definable over a model,
a principle which we get for free in models of Σ1 (or more) separation. The
definition uses the concept of a Q-structure, defined at 1.8 in [15]. Let M be a
mouse in the old sense of [3], then:
Definition 2.1. Let M  “F is a normal measure on κ”, where F is, in V , the
closed-unbounded filter on κ. Then the Q-structure of M at κ is:
QMκ = 〈JFθ ,∈, F ∩ JFθ 〉
where θ is largest such that:
JFθ  “F is normal, and the club filter on κ.”
We will not make extensive use of this material and haven’t changed much
from [15], so we omit the majority of the details, commenting rather on the
changes where they exist.
The next two subsections introduce more notation as well as the required
generalisations.
2.1. The Difference Hierarchy and Refinements
The difference hierarchy was developed by Hausdorff, and a discussion can
be found in [6]. We first cover the basic case, then develop the refinement we
are considering and prove some basic lemmas.
Following the nomenclature of [13], let us fix Γ to be an adequate pointclass
closed under countable intersection in some ambient Polish space X , for instance
in the intended case, the class of Π11 sets in Baire space, ω
ω. Then, if α is a
countable ordinal we denote the αth level of the difference hierarchy on Γ by
α - Γ: a pointset A is in α - Γ iff there is a sequence 〈Aξ | ξ ≤ α〉, with each
Aξ ∈ Γ and Aα = ∅ such that:
x ∈ A↔ the least ξ such that x /∈ Aξ is odd,
in which case we say the sequence 〈Aξ | ξ ≤ α〉 witnesses that A ∈ α - Γ. Since Γ
is assumed to be closed under countable intersections we can take the sequence
to be downwards-closed, that is Aα ⊇ Aβ if α < β, by rewriting Aβ as
⋂
α≤β Aα
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if necessary. The definition of the difference hierarchy ensures that intersections
with previous members of the sequence do not affect the resulting set A.
These pointclasses serve as a further stratification in the Borel hierarchy;
each α - Π0n is strictly between Π
0
n and ∆
0
n+1 as long as α is countable, by a
result of Hausdorff. Note while we can consider pointclasses Γ that are not
closed under countable intersections, say Σ0n, then already ω - Σ
0
n captures all
of the Π0n+1 sets, so this is not as interesting, and the results below become
trivial.
We can make the hierarchy even finer by restricting the final set in the
witnessing sequence. We adopt the following notation for this:
Definition 2.2. If Λ ⊆ Γ is a pointclass, we say A ∈ (α - Γ) + Λ iff there is a
sequence 〈Aξ | ξ ≤ α + 1〉 witnessing that A ∈ (α + 1) - Γ, with Aα ∈ Λ. Note
that Aα+1 is still ∅.
With this notation it is clear that α - Γ + Γ is just (α+ 1) - Γ, but for general
Λ we end up with a different pointclass.
We now present a couple of elementary results about these refinements to
the difference hierarchy. Let ¬Γ denote the dual class of the pointclass Γ.
Lemma 2.3. If λ is a countable limit ordinal, then the dual class, ¬((λ - Γ) +
Λ) = (λ - Γ) + ¬Λ.
Proof. Let 〈Aα | α ≤ λ+1〉 witness that Ac ∈ (λ - Γ)+Λ, and we want to find a
sequence witnessing that A ∈ (λ - Γ)+¬Λ. Define the sequence 〈Bα | α ≤ λ+1〉
as follows:
Bη = X , when η < λ is zero or a limit ordinal
Bα+1 = Aα, when α ≤ λ
Bλ = (Aλ)
c,
Bλ+1 = ∅.
So assuming λ > ω, the sequence looks like:
〈X , A1, A2, . . . ,X , Aω, . . . , (Aλ)c,∅〉,
with the whole space X inserted at zero and each limit position below λ. Now,
this sequence is a witness that some set is in (λ - Γ) + ¬Λ, since it is of the
correct length and Bλ ∈ ¬Λ. Denote this set B and we show Ac = B.
Let x ∈ X , then let α be the least ordinal such that x /∈ Aα. By construction,
the least β such that x /∈ Bβ is α+ 1, unless α = λ+ 1 in which case β = α− 1.
In either case x ∈ Ac ↔ x ∈ B.
We’ve shown that ¬((λ - Γ) + Λ) ⊆ (λ - Γ) +¬Λ, but note that we can apply
the same argument to get that ¬((λ - Γ) + ¬Λ) ⊆ (λ - Γ) + Λ, since ¬¬A = A.
Hence since taking dual classes preserves subsets, ((λ - Γ) + ¬Λ) ⊆ ¬((λ - Γ) +
Λ).
For a pointclass Γ, ∆(Γ) denotes the self-dual pointclass, Γ ∩ ¬Γ.
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Corollary 2.4. If λ is a countable limit ordinal, then λ - Γ + ∆(Γ) ⊆ ∆((λ +
1) - Γ).
Proof. This follows immediately from the previous lemma:
λ - Γ + ∆(Γ) = λ - Γ + ¬∆(Γ) = ¬(λ - Γ + ∆(Γ)) ⊆ ¬((λ+ 1) - Γ).
Together these results will help extend the pattern down in the Borel hier-
archy, that if we know Det(Σ0n), say, we get the dual class, Det(Π
0
n), for free.
Hence in the cases we are considering, having proved Det(ω2 - Π11 + Σ
0
2), we will
know immediately that Det(ω2 - Π11 + Π
0
2), and indeed Det(ω
2 - Π11 + ∆
0
2) hold.
2.2. Effective Descriptive Set Theory with Uncountable Spaces
The auxiliary game we construct to prove Det(ω2 - Π11 + Γ) has a payoff set
in the space (ω×ℵω)ω. While it’s not hard to see that such a set will be in the
boldface counterpart of Γ in this space, we will need a closer analysis than this.
Firstly, we need to know that the payoff set is at least definable over the
weak models for which we have indiscernibles, and secondly proving determinacy
in these models requires tools from effective descriptive set theory. Effective
descriptive set theory is defined in terms of computable functions on ω, which
will not suffice when working with an uncountable space. We therefore need
to generalise the theory and reprove several basic results in the uncountable
context.
Let T ∗ be the tree F<ω for F = ω×ℵω. This will be the tree for the auxiliary
game.
Definition 2.5 (Generalised Recursive Pointclasses). Define the following struc-
ture, the analogue of the hereditarily finite sets for classical recursion theory:
H = 〈Lℵω [〈ℵi | i < ω〉],∈, 〈ℵi | i < ω〉〉.
Fix a predicate R(x∗, a) ⊆ [T ∗] × F (although the below definitions generalise
trivially to predicates on [T ∗]n×Fm×ωl). Then R is generalised-semi-recursive
if there is a Σ1(H)-definable set X ⊆ T ∗ × F such that
R(x∗, a) ⇐⇒ ∃m〈x∗  m, a〉 ∈ X.
In other words, if R is the Σ1(H)-union of basic open subsets of [T ∗]× F . R is
called generalised-recursive if its complement is also of this form.
Remark. Compare this with HF , over which the computably enumerable re-
lations on ω are Σ1, or to α-recursion theory which considers subsets of α.
This can be seen as extending α-recursion theory to subsets of αω, where we in
particular take α = ℵω.
A coding of (ℵω)<ω into ℵω will allow us to talk about generalised-recursive
relations on T ∗ itself. Since H is closed under Go¨del pairing, the Go¨del pairing
function G on ℵω is total and hence ∆H1 , allowing consideration of such relations.
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Definition 2.6 (Generalised Kleene Pointclasses). Then for a predicate P
(which may be a subset of [T ∗] × Fm × ωl in general, but which we write
below as a subset of [T ∗]× F for clarity):
1. P is Σ˜01 iff P is generalised-semi-recursive;
2. P is Σ˜0n+1 iff there is a Π˜
0
n predicate R ⊆ [T ∗] × F × ω such that
P (x∗, a) ⇐⇒ ∃b ∈ ω(R(x∗, a, b));
3. P is Π˜0n iff ¬P is Σ˜0n;
4. P is ∆˜0n iff it is Σ˜
0
n and Π˜
0
n.
We then define the generalised analytic sets for X ⊆ [T ∗]× F :
X ∈ Σ˜11 ⇐⇒ ∃Y ∈ Π˜01(x ∈ X ↔ ∃y ∈ [T ∗](〈x, y〉 ∈ Y )).
The Σ˜1n, Π˜
1
n and ∆˜
1
n sets follow as usual.
Remark. The notion of computability is still the only difference with the usual
lightface hierarchy; the subsequent levels are still built by (generalised) recursive
unions, and complementation. Note that we take countable unions so as to align
this hierarchy with the usual Borel hierarchy.
Lemma 2.7. Suppose P is Σ˜0n or Π˜
0
n and f : [T
∗] → [T ∗] is such that the
relation G ⊆ [T ∗]× T ∗ given by G(a, p) ⇐⇒ p ⊆ f(a). Then the set f−1“P is
also Σ˜0n or Π˜
0
n, respectively.
Proof. First suppose P is Σ˜01 and consider the set f
−1“P = {a | f(a) ∈ P}. By
our assumption on f there is a Σ1(H) set C such that
p ⊆ f(a) ⇐⇒ ∃m(〈a  m, p〉 ∈ C).
Let C¯ be the Σ1(H) set {q | ∃p ∈ P (〈q, p〉 ∈ C)}, and note that:
∃m(a  m ∈ C¯) ⇐⇒ ∃m(∃p ∈ P (p ⊆ f(a)  m)
⇐⇒ ∃m(f(a)  m ∈ P )
⇐⇒ a ∈ f−1“P,
which is Σ˜01.
If the result holds for Σ˜0n, and ¬Q = P ∈ Σ˜0n then:
a ∈ f−1“p ⇐⇒ f(a) ∈ P ⇐⇒ f(a) /∈ Q ⇐⇒ a /∈ f−1“Q.
So the result holds for Π˜0n.
Now assuming inductively that the result holds for Π˜0n, let P be Σ˜
0
n+1. There
is thus a Π˜0n set Q such that:
f−1“P = {a | ∃m(〈f(a),m〉 ∈ Q)}
= {a | ∃m(〈a,m〉 ∈ f¯−1“Q)},
Where f¯ is the function given by f¯(〈a,m〉) = 〈f(a),m〉.
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The following two propositions are obvious relationships between these point-
classes and the usual pointclasses.
Proposition 2.8. Σ0n ⊆ Σ˜0n ⊆ Σ0n, where the pointclasses are taken to be in the
spaces of ωω, [T ∗] and [T ∗], respectively; the boldface Borel hierarchy on [T ∗]
being the usual topological definition.
Proof. The first inclusion is seen by an easy induction starting with the obser-
vation that Σ01 relations on ω
ω are a union of a ΣHF1 set of basic open sets,
which is thus also a Σ1(H) set. The second inclusion follows directly from the
definition.
In the following proposition, ∨ and ∧ denote the pointclasses formed by sets
being the union (respectively intersection) of a set in the first class with one in
the second.
Proposition 2.9. (Σ0n ∨ Σ˜01), (Σ0n ∧ Π˜01) ⊆ Σ˜0n for n > 1.
Proof. For the first we need to observe that [T ∗] is a metrizable space, hence
Σ˜01 sets are Σ˜
0
n. (The proof works as in the classical setting.) By the above, for
the second part we just need to see that Π˜01 ⊆ Σ˜0n for n > 1 as for the usual
pointclasses.
We note at this point that ultimately we will be interested in the analogue of
H built on some sequence ~c ∈ [ℵω]ω instead of 〈ℵi | i ∈ ω〉. For concreteness we
present this section in terms of the ℵis, since this doesn’t change anything. For
the rest of this section, by “admissible” we mean “admissible in the language
of set theory augmented with constants ~c;” for now they will be interpreted as
the ℵis but this need not be the case in general.
Lemma 2.10. If R is a generalised-recursive well-founded relation and M is
admissible with H ∈M , then rkR ∈M .
Proof. If R is ∆˜01 and wellfounded, then let
S = {〈p0, . . . , pk〉 | ∀i < k(pi+1Rpi)}.
For p, q ∈ S let p <R q if either p ) q or, for i the least point where pi 6= qi,
pi < qi. Then <R wellorders S, is generalised-recursive and ot <R is at least
rkR.
Now we need to show that the order-type of a generalised-recursive well-
order—a generalised-recursive ordinal—is an element of M . Let α = On ∩M ,
hence α > ℵω is an admissible ordinal and
N = 〈Lα[〈ℵi | i ∈ ω〉],∈, 〈ℵi | i ∈ ω〉〉〉
is admissible. Now, since <R is definable over H, it is an element of
〈L(ℵω)+1[〈ℵi | i ∈ ω〉],∈, 〈ℵi | i ∈ ω〉〉〉
which is a subset of N . By admissibility (i.e. recursion) let f be a ΣN1 order-
preserving bijection between <R and ot(<R). Hence ot(<R) ∈ N , and On∩M =
On ∩N .
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Lemma 2.11. Let x∗ ∈ [T ∗] be Σ˜11. Then there is a Π˜01 tree R ⊆ ω × F × T ∗
such that
x∗(n) = a ⇐⇒ ∃y ∈ [T ∗](〈〈n, a〉, y〉 ∈ [R]).
Proof. A Π˜01 relation on ω
n × Fm × T ∗ is a tree if its T ∗ component is closed
under initial segments, that is:
〈i1, . . . in, a1, . . . , am, q〉 ∈ R ∧ p ⊆ q =⇒ 〈i1, . . . in, a1, . . . , am, p〉 ∈ R.
Let R be such a tree with n = m = 1 for simplicity, then the set of branches of
R is:
[R] = {〈n, a, x∗〉 ∈ ω × F × [T ∗] | ∀m(〈n, a, x∗  m ∈ R)}.
Now, being Σ˜11 means that there is a Π˜
0
1 predicate Y such that:
x∗(n) = a ⇐⇒ ∃y ∈ [T ∗](Y (〈〈n, a〉, y〉))
⇐⇒ ∃y ∈ [T ∗]∀m(〈〈n, a〉, y  m〉 /∈ AY ),
where AY is the Σ1(H) set witnessing that Y is Π˜01. So let R consist of all
elements 〈〈n, a〉, p〉 such that ∀m ≤ |p|〈〈n, a〉, p  m〉 /∈ AY , so that R is a tree,
is Π˜01 and x
∗(n) = a ⇐⇒ ∃y〈〈n, a〉, y〉 ∈ [R].
For 〈n, a〉 ∈ ω×F and a tree R ⊆ ω×F ×T ∗, denote by T〈n,a〉 the 〈n, a〉’th
part of R, that is, {p ∈ T ∗ | 〈〈n, a〉, p〉 ∈ R}. Then the above lemma says that
x∗ is Σ˜11 iff there is a Π˜
0
1 tree R such that x
∗(n) = a ⇐⇒ R〈n,a〉 is illfounded
(the reverse direction being obvious).
Of course, the lemma extends easily to relations X ⊆ Fn × (T ∗)m × [T ∗]l,
in which case X is Σ˜11 if (and only if) there is a generalised-recursive tree R ⊆
Fn × Fm × (T ∗)l × T ∗ such that
〈a, p, x〉 ∈ X ⇐⇒ ∃y ∈ [T ∗](〈a, e(p), x, y〉 ∈ [R])
where e is a fixed generalised-recursive coding of F into T ∗. Put more succinctly,
X ⊆ [T ∗] is Σ˜11 iff there is a generalized-recursive tree R ⊆ T ∗ × T ∗ such that:
x ∈ X ⇐⇒ Rx is illfounded
where Rx = {y ∈ T ∗ | 〈x  |y|, y〉 ∈ R}.
Lemma 2.12. If x∗ ∈ [T ∗] is Σ˜11, then x∗ is Π1-definable over any admissible
containing H as an element.
Proof. This is essentially the Spector-Gandy theorem for elements of [T ∗] in-
stead of 2ω. Let M be an arbitrary admissible set with H ∈M .
By the above find R ⊆ ω×F×T ∗, a Π˜01 tree such that x∗(n) = a ⇐⇒ R〈n,a〉
is illfounded. R is Π1 definable over H, hence ∆1 definable over M , and so by
∆1 separation in M , R ∈M . Let ϕ(〈n, a〉) be the Σ1 formula:
∃γ, g(γ ∈ On ∧ g : R〈n,a〉 → γ is order-preserving).
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Suppose x∗(n) 6= a. Then R〈n,a〉 is wellfounded and an element of M , so by
admissibility there is γ < On∩M and g : R〈n,a〉 → γ witnessing the fact, hence
ϕ(〈n, a〉) holds in M . On the other hand if M  ϕ(〈n, a〉) then R〈n,a〉 is really
wellfounded and so x∗(n) 6= a. Hence x∗(n) = a ⇐⇒ M  ¬ϕ(〈n, a〉).
Corollary 2.13. Under the same hypotheses, x∗ is an element of any admissible
set which itself contains an admissible containing T ∗.
Proof. Let M ∈ N be admissible and T ∗ ∈ M . Then x∗ is definable over M
and M ∈ N is transitive. Hence, since the satisfaction relation is ∆KP1 , by
admissibility (x∗)M ∈ N . Since (x∗)M is the “true” x∗, we have that x∗ ∈
N .
Remark. This conclusion remains true if x∗ is a Σ˜11 element of 2
T∗ , since it will
be a Π1-definable class of M , hence an element of N .
The following is then a weak analogue of the Kleene Basis Theorem in our
setting:
Theorem 2.14. If X∗ ⊆ [T ∗] is Σ˜11 and non-empty, then X∗ has an element
definable over any admissible set M with T ∗ ∈M .
Proof. In light of the above, it will suffice to show that X∗ has an element which
is recursive in some Σ˜11 element of [T
∗]. This will then be definable over any M
which is admissible and contains T ∗ as an element.
Since X∗ is Σ˜11 there is a Π˜
0
1 tree T ⊆ T ∗ × T ∗ such that x∗ ∈ X∗ ⇐⇒ Tx∗
is illfounded. Hence any infinite branch of T determines an element of X∗, and
we need to find such a branch in M . Define P to be the set of elements of T
which can be extended to an infinite branch:
P = {p = 〈(a0, b0), (a1, b1), . . . , (at, bt)〉 ∈ T | ∃y ⊇ p∀n(y  n ∈ T )}.
P is Σ˜11 by definition, so by the Spector-Gandy theorem for T
∗ × T ∗, we have
that P is ΠM1 .
Then the leftmost path through P is defined by recursion by:
y(n) = the least a ∈ F × F such that (y  n)̂a ∈ P
which is definable from P and hence over M , and the left part of y is an element
of X∗.
Remark. It would be natural to consider the more direct analogue of Kleene’s
Basis Theorem by finding a Σ˜11 basis for the Σ˜
1
1 sets, but for our purposes, the
above suffices and is more expeditious.
We also note that Shoenfield Absoluteness holds for these models:
Theorem 2.15. If A ⊆ ωω is Σ12(a), then A is absolute for models M as
considered above, i.e. which are admissible with T ∗ ∈M , if in addition a ∈M .
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Proof. Note we are now concerned with the usual Σ12 sets, so the crucial things to
know are that firstly Σ12(a) sets are ω1-Suslin, and secondly that the Shoenfield
tree can be ranked in our models. (See, for instance, the final remarks in
[8], 13.15.) Thankfully, the Shoenfield tree is easily generalised-recursive; it is
defined as:
Tˆ = {〈p, u〉 ∈ ω<ω × ω<ω1 | ∀i, j < |p|(si ⊇ sj ∧ 〈s  |si|, si〉 ∈ T → u(i) < u(j)}
where 〈si | i ∈ ω〉 is a standard recursive enumeration of elements of ω<ω and
T is the Π11(a) tree witnessing that A is Σ
1
2(a). Now this is a ∆1({a})-definable
element of Lω1 [a], and is hence ∆
H[a]
1 where
H[a] = 〈Lℵω [〈ℵi〉, a],∈, 〈ℵi〉, a〉
Hence Tˆ is also ∆
H[a]
1 and with minor modification, the method of Lemma 2.10
shows that wellfoundedness of such trees is absolute for M . But this is just
what is needed to prove Shoenfield’s absoluteness theorem.
3. Obtaining Indiscernibles
3.1. Introduction
We aim to define a notion of Prikry forcing which, when executed over a
model of KPn yields a generic extension which is also a model of KPn, and
which satisfies a form of generating indiscernibility. This is all a straightforward
checking that the forcing can be defined over the model and preserves KPn.
First we define the indiscernibility principle we are interested in:
Definition 3.1. A closed-unbounded class of ordinals C is a class of Σn gener-
ating indiscernibles for the theory T if, for any ~c, ~d ∈ [C]ω, letting AT [~c] be the
least transitive model of T containing ~c as an element, we have AT [~c] ≡Σn AT [~d].
First of all we seek to prove:
Theorem 3.2. If there exists a non-trivial mouse which is a model of KPn,
then there exists a class of Σn generating indiscernibles for KPn.
Fix a mouse
M = 〈JEθ , E, F 〉  “KPn + F is a normal measure on κ”.
Let us fix some terminology for the remainder of the section:
Definition 3.3. Let C = {κ0, κ1, . . .} be the class of iteration points of M by
F , and let ~c = {c0, c1, . . .} ∈ [C]ω be any fixed ω-sequence of them indexed in
increasing order. Then let λ be such that the measurable cardinal of Mλ, the λth
iterate, is sup~c, pi : M →Mλ the iteration map. With Eλ, Fλ the filter sequence
and top measure of Mλ, respectively, let θ˜ be such that Mλ = 〈JEλ
θ˜
, Eλ, Fλ〉.
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Now note that by Σn separation we may apply  Los’ theorem to Σn for-
mulæ, so these ultrapowers preserve Σn sentences, and hence C is a set of Σn
indiscernibles for Mλ.
We use the notation X r p, for sets of ordinals X, p to mean X \ (sup p+ 1).
Lemma 3.4. Let p = {c0, . . . , ck} and e ∈ [C]<ω be a finite set of iteration
points with max e < ck. Let X ∈ Fλ be Σn-definable in Mλ from pi(f) (for
f ∈Mκ), e, p. Then X ⊇ C r p.
Proof. By the properties of iterated ultrapowers, the measure 1 set X must
include an end-segment from C, which, as remarked above, is a set of Σn-
indiscernibles for Mλ. Thus X contains at least one indiscernible greater than
all the indiscernible parameters in its definition, and so by indiscernibility, it
contains all indiscernible greater than max p.
We need to know more, namely that KPn is preserved in the ultrapower.
Theorem 3.5. Mλ  KPn.
Proof. First suppose that we know that the iterate Mα  KPn. We use the
standard fact that the theory of KPn is equivalent to there being no Σn-definable
partial function, whose image of a set in the model is unbounded in the ordinals
of the model.
Thus let ϕ(ξ, γ, p) define a Σn-partial function f ; f(ξ) = γ ↔ ϕ(ξ, γ, p),
with f and A ∈ Mα+1 witnessing the failure of KPn, i.e. f“A is unbounded in
On ∩Mα+1.
Expanding f“A being unbounded, we get the Πn+1 formula:
Mα+1  ∀τ∃γ > τ∃ξ ∈ A(ϕ(ξ, γ, p)).
Fix p = piαα+1(g)(κα) for some g ∈Mα. By cofinality of the ultrapower embed-
ding piαα+1, let A¯ be such that A ⊆ piαα+1(A¯). Then fix an arbitrary τ¯ ∈ Mα,
and by applying  Los´’ theorem to the above for τ = piαα+1(τ¯):
Mα  {β < κα | ∃γ > τ¯∃ξ ∈ A¯(ϕ(ξ, γ, g(β)))} ∈ Fα.
Hence:
Mα  ∀τ¯ [∃q∃ξ ∈ A¯∃γ > τ¯(ϕ(ξ, γ, q))]
and hence the formula ψ(ξ, γ) ≡ γ = sup{γ′ | ∃qϕ(ξ, γ′, q)} defines a Σn partial
function f¯ , since the γ′s are bounded by KPn. But then:
f¯“A¯ = {γ | ∃ξ ∈ A¯(ψ(ξ, γ))}
is unbounded, thus contradicting KPn in Mα.
Thus we have shown that if Mα  KPn, so too does Mα+1, and we just have
to show that the limit models behave similarly. But if ν is limit and p,X ∈Mν
then take θ such that p = piθ,ν(p¯) and X = piθ,ν(X¯). By induction we may
assume that if ϕ is Σn, B¯ = {α ∈ X¯ | ϕ(α, p¯)} is an element of Mθ. Hence
{α ∈ X | ϕ(α, p)} = {α ∈ piθ,ν(X¯) | ϕ(α, piθ,ν(p¯))} = piθ,ν(B¯) ∈Mν
by elementarity, and we are done.
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3.2. The Forcing
Mλ will be the ground model for Prikry forcing, which will add the set of
indiscernibles ~c to the generic extension, whilst preserving KPn.
Rowbottom’s theorem will be needed for several of the proofs in this section:
Lemma 3.6. KP proves that if κ is a measurable cardinal with normal measure
F , and f is a partition of [κ]<ω into less than κ pieces, then there is a ∆1(f)
set H ∈ F homogeneous for f , i.e. such that for each n, f is constant on [H]n.
Proof. This is essentially [7], Theorem 10.22. Let F be a normal measure on
κ, and let f partition [κ]<ω into less than κ pieces. If we can find measure one
sets Hn such that f is homogeneous on [Hn]
n, then f is also homogeneous for
H =
⋂
Hn.
For n = 1 consider the intersection
⋂{κ \ f−1“{α} | α ∈ ranf}. This set is
empty, so by κ-completeness one of the terms must have been measure zero, i.e.
some α must have pre-image of measure one, which we take to be H1.
Now proceed by induction: let f : [κ]n+1 → I for some |I| < κ. Now for
each α < κ we define fα with domain [κ \ {α}]n by fα(x) = f({α} ∪ x). By
hypothesis there exist ∆1 sets Xα ∈ F such that fα is constant on [Xα]n. We
fix this constant value to be iα. By KP the sequence {Xα | α < κ} exists.
Let X be the diagonal intersection of the Xαs, {α < κ | α ∈
⋂
γ<αXγ},
which is in F by normality, and is a ∆1 subset of κ. Now if γ < α1 <
. . . < αn are in X, then {α1, . . . , αn} ∈ [Xγ ]n, so that f({γ, α1, . . . , αn}) =
fγ({α1, . . . , αn}) = iγ . Now, γ 7→ iγ constitutes a partition of [X]n into γ < κ
pieces, so again by hypothesis we know there is i ∈ I and a ∆1 set H ⊆ X in F
such that iγ = i for all γ ∈ H, hence f(x) = i for all x ∈ [H]n+1.
The way we will use Rowbottom’s theorem is, if we have a set A ⊆ [κ]<ω,
we view the characteristic function of A as a partition of [κ]<ω into 2. There is
then a ∆1(A) set Z ∈ F such that either [Z]<ω ⊆ A or [Z]<ω ∩A = ∅.
We now set up the basic forcing definitions in a way suitable for this purpose.
This will require a return to ramified forcing, as originally conceived by Cohen
(see [1]) and used in [15]. Since the forcing we use will be a class forcing from
the perspective of the model, our setting is more general than that used by
Cohen in [1], and the use of theories stronger than KP means we extend Welch’s
work, too. In addition, accounts since Cohen’s of ramified forcing have mostly
been sketched, without full definitions or proofs, and the notation of Cohen’s
account is now outdated. For these two reasons, we set out the full definitions
and proofs here. We will need to check that the usual properties of forcing hold
in spite of our weak setting and the fact that we are using a class forcing.
Definition 3.7. Let 〈P,≤〉 be Prikry forcing defined over Mλ, that is:
P := {〈p,X〉 | p ∈ [κ]<ω, X ∈ Fλ ∩Mλ}
〈p,X〉 ≤ 〈q, Y 〉 ↔ q is an initial segment of p ∧X ∪ (p \ q) ⊆ Y.
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This class is ∆1-definable over Mλ, but since Fλ is not a set in the model, it
is not a set forcing and so most of the work will be towards proving that KPn
is preserved.
Definition 3.8. We define a ranked forcing language, LFλ . First of all, we
define constants for the language, which are representations of class terms and
are intended to name sets in the generic extension.
C0 consists of {~˙c} ∪ κλ, where ~˙c is a constant symbol.
If Cα is defined then Cα+1 consists of the class terms {xα | ϕ(xα)} where ϕ
is a formula built up from: symbols ∈,=, ~˙c; any element of Cβ for β < α; logical
connectives and where any quantified variable is of the form ∃xβ for β ≤ α.
Take unions at limit stages, and let C = ⋃α<θ˜ Cα. (Recall that θ˜ is the
height of Mλ.)
The rank of one of these constants is the ordinal α such that it is an element
of Cα.
LFλ then consists of all formulæ built from the symbols: ∈,=; unranked vari-
ables x, y, z, . . .; ranked variables xα, yα, zα for α < θ˜; connectives; quantifiers;
and elements of Cα for α < θ˜.
If ϕ ∈ LFλ then we say it is ranked if every variable in it is ranked, in which
case its rank is the maximum of the ranks of quantified variables in ϕ and of
the ranks of any constant terms occurring in ϕ.
We now define the weak forcing relation p ∗ ϕ for p = 〈p,X〉 ∈ P and ϕ a
sentence in LFλ :
1. p ∗ x ∈ y iff x ∈ Cα, y ∈ Cβ and:
(a) α = β = 0 and either x ∈ y ∈ κ or x ∈ p ∧ y = ~˙c; or
(b) α < β, y = {zγ | ϕ(zγ)} and p ∗ ϕ(x); or else
(c) α ≥ β and ∃z ∈ Cγ for some γ, either β > γ or β = γ = 0 and
p ∗ z = x ∧ z ∈ y
2. p ∗ x = y iff p ∗ ∀zα(z ∈ x↔ z ∈ y) for α the maximum of the ranks
of x and y.
3. p ∗ ϕ ∧ ψ iff p ∗ ϕ and p ∗ ψ.
4. p ∗ ¬ϕ iff ∀q ∈ P(q ≤ p =⇒ q 1∗ ϕ).
5. p ∗ ∃xα(ϕ(xα)) iff there is some t ∈ Cα such that p ∗ ϕ(t).
6. p ∗ ∃x(ϕ(x)) iff there is some t ∈ ⋃α Cα such that p ∗ ϕ(t).
We note that another notion of rank may be defined for formulæ of the
forcing language that are ranked as defined above, so that whenever the defi-
nition of p ∗ ϕ refers to a formula ψ of the forcing language, this new rank
strictly decreases. This makes the above recursive definition legitimate, and
allows arguments about the forcing relation “by induction on ϕ.”
Definition 3.9. A filter G ⊂ P is Mλ-generic for P if it meets all ΣMλn -definable
subsets of P and if, for every Σn sentence ϕ of the forcing language, there is a
p ∈ G such that p ∗ ϕ ∨ p ∗ ¬ϕ.
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Remark. Note that the latter requirement also implies that such a generic de-
cides every Πn sentence.
Usually these two forms of genericity are equivalent, but here we will have
to prove them both.
If G is Mλ-generic for P then let ~c =
⋃{p ∈ [κλ]<ω | ∃X ∈ Fλ(〈p,X〉 ∈ G)}.
If we define an appropriate G, this will be the sequence ~c of iteration points we
picked above. The generic extension is defined as Mλ[G] = 〈J~cθ˜ ,~c〉, and if there
is only one G under discussion we write Mλ[~c].
This forcing relation obeys the usual properties:
Lemma 3.10.
1. For no p, ϕ does p ∗ ϕ ∧ ¬ϕ;
2. If p ∗ ϕ and q ≤ p then q ∗ ϕ;
3. p ∗ ϕ ⇐⇒ ∀q ≤ p∃r ≤ q(r ∗ ϕ);
Proof.
1–2 are standard and can be found in [1] Section IV.4.
3. The forward implication is obvious by 2 and the backwards implication is
proved by induction on ϕ: Suppose first that ϕ is x ∈ y. If x, y ∈ C0 and
y ∈ κ, then, since forcing this doesn’t depend on p, there’s nothing to do.
If ϕ is x ∈ ~˙c then we have to show that x ∈ p where p = 〈p,X〉. But
if not, then we can find q ∈ X \ {x} and then 〈p ∪ {q}, X〉 ∗ ¬ϕ for a
contradiction.
For every other case we use the induction hypothesis in the obvious way.
The reason for using the ranked forcing language is that it allows the forcing
relation to be simply definable, as we prove in the following lemma:
Lemma 3.11. If p ∈ P and ϕ ∈ LFλ is a ranked sentence, then:
1. If p = 〈p,X〉 there is a ∆Mλ1 (p, ϕ) set Y ∈ Fλ such that 〈p, Y 〉‖ϕ, that is
either 〈p, Y 〉 ∗ ϕ or 〈p, Y 〉 ∗ ¬ϕ; and
2. 〈p, Y 〉 ∗ ϕ is ∆Mλ1 .
Proof. The first assertion is a re-statement of the Prikry lemma, but we will
prove both statements in a simultaneous induction on the complexity of ϕ.
First suppose ϕ is x ∈ y for x, y ∈ C0. Then certainly p ∗ ϕ is ∆1-definable.
If p ∗ ϕ, then set Y = X and we are also done with part 2. If not, then:
(x /∈ y ∨ y /∈ κ) ∧ (x /∈ p ∨ y 6= ~˙c).
This is preserved when strengthening p, so in fact p ∗ ¬ϕ, and again we can
take Y = X for part 2.
Now suppose we have proved the statement of the lemma for all formulæ
occurring in the definition of p ∗ ϕ. We shall not carry out the proof in every
case, but the following illustrate the most important and involved parts:
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1. If ϕ is x ∈ y with x, y having rank α < β respectively, then let y = {zγ |
ψ(zγ)}. Then the induction hypothesis says that for each d ∈ Cγ there is
an extension of p to 〈p, Yd〉 which decides ψ(d). The condition px = 〈p, Yx〉
therefore decides ψ(x). By definition, px ∗ x ∈ y ⇐⇒ px ∗ ψ(x), so
we are done.
2. If ϕ is ¬ψ, then by hypothesis extend p to 〈p, Y 〉 in a ∆1 way such that
〈p, Y 〉‖ψ. But then 〈p, Y 〉 also decides ϕ.
Likewise if we know 〈p, Y 〉 ∗ ψ then 〈p, Y 〉 1∗ ϕ and vice-versa, and if
the former is ∆1 definable over Mλ then so is the latter.
3. If ϕ is ∃xα(ψ(xα)) then define:
S+ = {q ∈ [X]<ω | ∃d,∃Xd ⊆ X(〈p ∪ q,Xd〉  ψ(d))}.
By hypothesis, for each q, d there is a ∆Mλ1 -definable set Y such that
〈p∪q, Y 〉‖ψ(d), and such that 〈p∪q, Y 〉 ∗ ψ(d) is ∆1. This means that the
existence of Xd in the definition of S+ is equivalent to 〈p ∪ q, Y 〉 ∗ ψ(d)
since, if 〈p∪ q, Y 〉 ∗ ¬ψ(d) there can be no such Xd as any 〈p∪ q,Xd〉 is
compatible with 〈p ∪ q, Y 〉.
Thus S+ is a ΣMλ1 subset of [κλ]
<ω and by Rowbottom’s theorem there is
a set A ∈ Fλ ∩Mλ such that either [A]<ω ⊆ S+ or [A]<ω ∩ S+ = ∅.
Suppose 〈p,A〉 does not decide ϕ. Hence there are conditions 〈r, Y 〉, 〈s, Z〉,
each stronger than 〈p,A〉 such that one forces ϕ and the other forces ¬ϕ.
Extending the shorter sequence if necessary, assume `h(r) = `h(s) = k.
Then 〈r, Y 〉 ≤ 〈p,A〉 so r ∈ [A]k, but similarly s ∈ [A]k. Hence [A]k
contains elements in S+ and out of it. This is a contradiction and so
〈p,A〉 decides ϕ.
Corollary 3.12. The relation p ∗ ϕ is ∆Mλ1 definable for ranked sentences ϕ,
ΣMλn for Σn sentences and Π
Mλ
n for Πn sentences of the forcing language.
Proof. Let p = 〈p,X〉. If ϕ is ranked then for each q ∈ [X]<ω let Y q be the set
produced by the above lemma given 〈p ∪ q,X〉, ϕ. Then:
p  ϕ ⇐⇒ ∀q ∈ [X]<ω(〈p ∪ q, Y q〉  ϕ).
The forward direction is obvious since 〈p∪ q, Y q〉 ≤ p, and the backward direc-
tion holds because then, taking any X ′ ⊆ X we have that 〈p ∪ q,X ′ ∩ Y q〉  ϕ,
i.e. the set of extensions of p which force ϕ is dense.
This proves the first part, since the given formula is ∆1, and for unranked
formulæ the result is a simple induction on Le´vy rank.
When interpreting a formula of LFλ in Mλ[~c], we interpret constant symbols
from Cα as the corresponding class term, ~˙c as the predicate ~c and quantification
over ranked variables ∃xα as bounded quantification ∃x ∈ J~cα.
Lemma 3.13 (Truth Lemma). If G is Mλ generic for P and ϕ is a Σn or a
Πn sentence of LFλ , then Mλ[G]  ϕ ⇐⇒ ∃p ∈ G(p ∗ ϕ).
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Proof. Again this is proved by induction on ϕ, first for ranked formulæ.
1. If ϕ is x ∈ y, we must check several cases, firstly assuming that p ∈
G,p ∗ ϕ. If x, y in Cα, Cβ , respectively, then firstly consider the case
when α = β = 0. Here we only need to check that p ∗ x ∈ ~˙c =⇒
Mλ[~c]  x ∈ ~c, which is true since by definition x ∈ p, and p ∈ G so p ⊆ ~c.
If α < β then p ∗ ψ(x) for ψ the defining formula of y. By induction,
Mλ[~c]  ψ(x), so Mλ[~c]  x ∈ y.
If α ≥ β then p ∗ z = x ∧ z ∈ y for some z ∈ Cγ , so inductively,
Mλ[~c]  z = x ∧ z ∈ y which completes the forward direction.
If Mλ[~c]  x ∈ y then first suppose y = ~c. Then ∃〈p,X〉 ∈ G(x ∈ p),
i.e. 〈p,X〉 ∗ x ∈ y. If y is an ordinal then every condition will force
x ∈ y. Otherwise, find α, β and x¯ ∈ Cα, y¯ ∈ Cβ such that x¯, y¯ evaluate to
x, y, respectively, in Mλ[~c]. When α < β, the proof is straightforward by
induction. If α ≥ β, we need to find γ < β, z¯ ∈ Cγ such that p ∗ z¯ =
x¯ ∧ z¯ ∈ y¯. But if x ∈ y then x occurs in the J~c hierarchy strictly before
y, and so is realised as a class term in Cγ for γ < β. From here induction
gives us what we want.
2. If ϕ is x = y then
Mλ[~c]  x = y ⇐⇒ ∃α < θ˜(∀z ∈ J~cα(z ∈ x↔ z ∈ y))
⇐⇒ ∃p ∈ G(p ∗ (∀zα(z ∈ x↔ z ∈ y)))
⇐⇒ ∃p ∈ G(p ∗ (x = y)),
where we use the induction hypothesis in the second equivalence.
3. If ϕ is ψ0 ∧ ψ1 then the argument is standard.
4. If ϕ is ¬ψ and p ∈ G, p ∗ ¬ψ, then suppose ψ held in Mλ[~c]. Then, by
the induction hypothesis there is q ∈ G(q ∗ ψ). But there would then
be a r ≤ p,q with r ∗ ψ∧¬ψ, which is impossible, completing the proof
of the right-to-left direction.
On the other hand if Mλ[~c]  ¬ψ then there is by genericity at least a
condition p ∈ G such that p‖ψ. If p ∗ ¬ψ then we are done, and
otherwise the inductive hypothesis for ψ would imply that Mλ[~c]  ψ,
which is impossible.
5. If ϕ is ∃xαψ(xα) and p ∈ G, p ∗ ϕ then there is some x ∈ Cα such that
p ∗ ψ(x), and hence Mλ[~c]  ψ(x), with x interpreted appropriately,
hence Mλ[~c]  ∃x ∈ J~cα(ψ(x)). The opposite direction is identical.
6. If ϕ is ∃xψ(x) and p ∈ G, p ∗ ϕ then there is some α such that p ∗
∃xαψ(xα), and we can use the previous case. If Mλ[~c]  ∃xψ(x) then, by
the definition of the generic extension, Mλ[~c]  x ∈ J~cα(ψ(x)), and again
we proceed as above.
We adopt the usual generalisation of diagonal intersection:
∆pAp = ∆α
(⋂
{Ap | max p < α}
)
.
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Theorem 3.14. The filter
G~c = {〈p,X〉 ∈ P | p is an initial segment of ~c and ~c \ p ⊆ X}
is Mλ-generic for (P)Mλ .
Proof. We first prove that G~c intersects every Σn dense class of Mλ. Let D be a
ΣMλn subset of P. Let Sp = {q ∈ [κλ]<ω | ∃X(〈p∪q,X〉 ∈ D)}. This is Σn, so by
Rowbottom’s theorem there is a measure 1 set Ap ∈ Fλ ∩Mλ such that either
[Ap]
<ω ⊆ Sp or [Ap]k ∩ Sp = ∅ for some k. If there is some X ∈ Fλ such that
〈p,X〉 ∈ D then let Xp be the Mλ-least and set Bp = Ap ∩ Xp, otherwise let
Bp = Ap. Then let B be the diagonal intersection of the Bp’s. Being measure
1, B includes a final segment of ~c, so let q be such that ~c \ q ⊆ B. By density
there must be an extension of 〈q,B〉, say 〈q ∪ t,X〉, lying in D.
If r ⊆ ~c extends q then r \ q ⊆ B by the way we picked q. By the definition
of B, Br q ⊆ Aq and so Br q is homogeneous for Sq. Thus since t ∈ Sq ∩Br q
by definition, [B r q]<ω ⊆ Sq. Hence r ∈ Sq, and so for some Y the condition
〈q ∪ r, Y 〉 ∈ D. Since q ∪ r ⊆ ~c, G ∩ D 6= ∅, completing the proof of the first
requirement for genericity.
Now we prove that G~c decides every Σn sentence of LFλ . If ϕ is ranked then
by Lemma 3.11 for any p ∈ [κλ]<ω there is a ∆Mλ1 (p, ϕ)-definable set X such
that 〈p,X〉‖ϕ. Since X is measure 1 it includes an end-segment of indiscernibles,
and since it is definable from p and ϕ, it contains every indiscernible beyond p.
Thus if p ⊆ ~c then 〈p,X〉 ∈ G~c, completing the proof in this case.
Suppose ϕ is ∃xψ(x), with ψ a Πk−1 formula of LFλ , k ≤ n, and fix p ∈
[κλ]
<ω. Suppose inductively that, for each t ∈ C, there is an X ∈ Fλ such that
〈p,X〉 ∈ G~c and 〈p,X〉‖ψ(t). Let:
θ(X) ≡ 〈p,X〉 ∗ ψ(t) ∨ 〈p,X〉 ∗ ¬ψ(t).
This is ∆k, so for each t, let Xt be the Mλ-least set satisfying θ, hence ∆
Mλ
k :
X = Xt ⇐⇒ θ(X) ∧ ∀Y (Y 6<Mλ X ∨ ¬θ(Y ))
⇐⇒ θ(X) ∧ ∃u(u = pr(X) ∧ ∀Y ∈ u(¬θ(Y ))).
Here pr is the ∆1 function returning the set of all <Mλ -predecessors of a set,
following [2] where this is defined for L in II.3.5. Thus t 7→ Xt is ∆Mλk and the
following set is ΠMλk :
Z = {α ∈ κλ | ∀t ∈ C(α ∈ Xt)}.
Z is, by Σk separation, an element of Mλ and Z ⊇ (~cr p), so p = 〈p, Z〉 ∈ G~c.
p‖ψ(t) for each t, so p‖ϕ, completing the induction and the proof.
Remark. Note that we may add finitely many elements of κλ to ~c, and the above
proof still works. This means that, if p = 〈p,X〉 ∈ P then Gp∪~c is Mλ-generic
and contains p.
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Theorem 3.15. p  ϕ ⇐⇒ p ∗ ϕ, for Σn formulæ ϕ.
Proof. By p  ϕ we mean the usual (semantic) forcing relation:
∀G(G is Mλ-generic for P ∧ p ∈ G→Mλ[G]  ϕ).
The right-to-left implication of the theorem is provided by the previous lemma.
For the forward direction suppose p  ϕ. Suppose for a contradiction that
the Σn class D = {q | q ∗ ϕ} is not dense below p. In other words, suppose
q ≤ p is such that ∀r ≤ q(r 1∗ ϕ), i.e. q ∗ ¬ϕ. But then by the right-to-left
implication, q  ¬ϕ. Let G be Mλ-generic for P with q ∈ G so Mλ[G]  ¬ϕ.
But p ∈ G, too, so Mλ[G]  ϕ, which is a contradiction.
We have now checked that the usual properties of forcing hold, and can use
the  relation as we normally would, safe in the knowledge that p  ϕ is Σn as
long as ϕ is.
3.2.1. The Generic Extension
We now want to prove that, in the Σn case of the Truth Lemma, it doesn’t
matter which initial segment of ~c we pick; we may always find a suitable measure-
1 set Y to force the statement.
Lemma 3.16. Let p = {c0, . . . , cl} and y an arbitrary constant Σn-definable
from ranpi and finitely many elements of C, with the maximum such element
cj < cl. Suppose ψ is Πn−1. Then:
Mλ[~c]  ∃zψ(z, y)⇔Mλ  ∃Y 〈p, Y 〉  ∃zψ(z, y).
Proof. Fixing p, suppose the left hand side holds, and work in Mλ. Then define:
A := {q ∈ [κλ r p]<ω | ∃z∃X〈p ∪ q,X〉  ψ(z, y)}.
A is ΣMλn (y, p), since p  ψ is ΠMλn−1 if n ≥ 2 (or ∆Mλ1 if n = 1.) By hypothesis
and the truth lemma, there is some extension of p in the generic that forces
∃zψ(z, y). Thus let q ⊆ ~c r p,X ∈ Fλ, z be such that p′ = 〈p ∪ q,X〉 ∈ G~c,
p′  ψ(z, y). Hence by indiscernibility, A contains any element of [C]<ω the
same length as q, and thus Mλ  A ∈ (Fλ)k. Hence by Rowbottom in Mλ, there
is Y ∈ Fλ with [Y ]k ⊆ A. For such a q ∈ A let Y be the Mλ-least such set, so
that Y is Σn-definable in Mλ from y and p. Then, if q ∈ [Y ]k for some k, let
zq, Xq be witnesses that q ∈ A.
The map q 7→ Xq is therefore Σn(y, p)-definable, allowing us to define:
Y ′ = ∆q(Xq r q) ∩ Y.
Y ′ is then the diagonal intersection of measure 1 sets and is Σn-definable, so
Mλ  Y ′ ∈ Fλ. Y ′ also is such that if q ∈ [Y ′]k then Y ′r q ⊆ Xq, since suppose
α ∈ Y ′rq (hence α > sup q), then α ∈ Xq′rq′ for all q′ with supremum smaller
than α. But sup q < α so α ∈ Xq. But we have now established that, for any
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〈p∪ q, Y¯ 〉 ≤ 〈p, Y ′〉, we have 〈p∪ q, Y¯ 〉 ≤ 〈p∪ q,Xq〉  ψ(zq, y) and we are done
with the forward direction.
Hence suppose the latter. Then let p = 〈p, Y 〉 be the Mλ-least such condi-
tion, hence Σn-definable in Mλ from y, p. But by indiscernibility in the form
of Lemma 3.4, Y ⊇ C r p, so p ∈ G~c by definition of the latter, and we are
done.
As mentioned above, we need to check that the generic extension is a model
of KPn.
Theorem 3.17. Mλ[~c]  KPn.
Proof. Since κλ is the largest cardinal in Mλ, we only need to consider functions
defined (partially) on κλ. Thus for any function f with dom f ⊆ κλ defined by
f(ξ) = y ⇔ ∃zϕ(y, ξ, z, d) (where ϕ ∈ ΠMλ[~c]n−1 and d is some parameter, thus ϕ
may refer to the generic via the predicate symbol G˙) we wish to prove:
Mλ[~c]  ∃ζ∀ξ ∈ κλ(ξ ∈ dom f → f(ξ) < ζ).
Thus let p = 〈p,X〉 = 〈{c0, . . . , ck}, X〉 ∈ G~c be a condition which forces the
following:
f is a function ∧ ranf ⊆ On.
The parameter d must, in Mλ, be definable from ~a ∈ ranpi and finitely many
indiscernibles, ~e ∈ [C]<ω since Mλ is an iterated ultrapower model. By strength-
ening p if necessary, assume max~e ≤ max p. For ξ ≤ max p, define yξ to be
such that:
∃Xξ(〈p,Xξ〉  f(ξ) = yξ)
wherever such a yξ exists. We claim this defines a Σ
Mλ
n (p, d) function defined
on dom f ∩ (max p + 1). First note that, if there is such a Xξ, then any other
〈p,X ′ξ〉 is compatible with 〈p,Xξ〉 and hence yξ is well defined.
For the domain, suppose Mλ[~c]  ξ ∈ dom f . Then by Lemma 3.16 there is
an X ′ ∈ Fλ such that 〈p,X ′〉  ξ ∈ dom f . Hence 〈p,X ′ ∩X〉  ξ ∈ dom f , i.e.
〈p,X ′ ∩X〉  ∃yf(ξ) = y, and so yξ must be defined.
The map ξ 7→ yξ is ΣMλn (p, d) and so by KPn has a bound, let’s say:
∀ξ ∈ dom f(ξ ≤ max p→ yξ < τp).
Hence if ξ ∈ dom f, ξ ≤ max p, we have 〈p,Xξ〉  f(ξ) = yξ and 〈p,Xξ〉 
f(ξ) < τp. Let D = dom f ∩ (max p+ 1), a Σn element of Mλ by KPn. Define:
A = {r ∈ [κλ r p]<ω | ∃τp∪r, Yr∀ξ ∈ D(〈p ∪ r, Yr〉  f(ξ) < τp∪r)}.
Now, A is Σn definable and for each l we know we can find some r = 〈ck+1, . . . , ck+l〉
such that r ∈ A, since we can find the corresponding τp∪r as we found τp. Thus
by indiscernibility, A ∈ (Fλ)l. But then by Rowbottom in Mλ, there is a set
Al ∈ Fλ such that [Al]l ⊆ A, and since all parameters in its definition are at
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most max p, Al ⊇ C r p. Then if we let A˜ =
⋂
lAl, we have that A˜ ⊇ C r p.
By KPn, let τ bound all the ordinals τp∪r for r ∈ [A˜]<ω.
Hence p˜ := 〈p, A˜∩X〉 ∈ G~c and for any ξ ∈ dom f , if 〈p∪q,B〉 is an arbitrary
extension of p˜, we can find some r ∈ [B]<ω (and so q ∪ r ∈ [A˜]<ω) such that
ξ ≤ max r and so 〈p∪ q∪ r, Yq∪r〉  f(ξ) < τp∪q∪r < τ . Hence p˜  sup ranf < τ
and we are done.
Theorem 3.18. If M is the <∗-least mouse such that M  KPn, then Mλ[~c] is
the smallest transitive model of KPn containing ~c as an element. Thus Mλ[~c] =
AKPn [~c] = Lθ˜[~c].
Proof. By Separation in Mλ[~c], we have that ~c is an element of Mλ[~c]. All
that remains to prove is minimality. Let N be a transitive model of KPn with
~c ∈ N . We claim that it is sufficient to consider N of the form J~cα: Otherwise,
if J~cα 6 KPn then there is a Σn-definable partial function definable over J~cα
unboundedly into the ordinals of J~cα. But this function would then be unbounded
and ΣN¯n for any admissible set N¯ with ~c ∈ N¯ of height α (since the J~cβ hierarchy
is ∆1 over any structure containing ~c) including N if On ∩N = α.
Now, we defined Mλ[~c] to be J
~c
θ˜
. Hence we need to show that J~cα is not a
model of KPn for α < θ˜.
But by leastness of M , Mλ is also the least J
F˜
α such that J
F˜
α  KPn. Thus
if α < θ˜, J F˜α is not a model of KPn and hence J
~c
α cannot be a model of KPn.
Since J~c
θ˜
is admissible, θ˜ = ωα and hence in fact Mλ[~c] = Lθ˜[~c].
Proof of Theorem 3.2. Since the class C of iteration points is a club, we just
have to prove the indiscernibility.
Here we abbreviate AKPn [~c], defined in Definition 3.1, by An[~c]. Since a
sentence of the language of An[~c] or An[~d] is a formula of set theory possibly
mentioning the predicate symbol G˙, it is sufficient to take such a Σn sentence ϕ
and show that An[~c] and An[~d] agree on ϕ. Let Mλ (respectively Mλ′) be the
iterate whose measurable cardinal is the supremum of ~c (respectively ~d.) Then,
using that forcing ϕ is Σn:
An[~d]  ϕ⇔Mλ′  ∃Y (〈∅, Y 〉  ϕ) By Lemma 3.16
⇔Mλ  ∃Y (〈∅, Y 〉  ϕ) By Σn-elementarity
⇔ An[~c]  ϕ By Lemma 3.16.
3.3. ZFC
The natural extension of these results to stronger mice will also be interest-
ing. In this section, M is a non-trivial ZFC-mouse with normal measure F . We
will prove:
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Theorem 3.19. If there is a non-trivial mouse M  ZFC then there is a class
C of Σω generating indiscernibles for ZFC.
Thus these are full indiscernibles and any two models generated by an ω-
sequence of them will be fully elementarily equivalent.
The procedure here is much simpler than in the preceding case. Since M 
ZFC again in the language of set theory augmented with a predicate for the
filter F on κ, F is a definable set in M by Separation and Power Set. Thus the
forcing is a set forcing and we can dispense with most of the analogues of the
previous section. Define again Mλ to be the λth iterate and have measurable
cardinal sup~c.
Lemma 3.20. Mλ[~c] = Aω[~c], the smallest transitive model of ZFC with ~c ∈
Aω[~c].
Proof. Since the forcing is set-sized, this is standard: we know thatMλ[~c]  ZFC,
~c ∈ Mλ[~c], and that Mλ[~c] is the smallest transitive model of ZFC containing
~c.
Proof of Theorem 3.19. Let ϕ be any sentence in the language of Aω[~c]. Then
since we have full elementarity between any two iterates of M ,
Aω[~c]  ϕ ⇐⇒ Mλ  (P ϕ) ⇐⇒ Mλ′  (P ϕ) ⇐⇒ Aω[~d]  ϕ
using the same notation as in the proof of Theorem 3.2.
3.4. Preserving substructures
Now let us abandon our previous notation and fix M = 〈JFα , F 〉 to be
an admissible structure of the kind discussed in [15], that is, the Q-structure
of a “clever” mouse, M0. Throughout this section, “admissible” will mean
a transitive model of KP in the language containing the predicate F . Then
M  KP ∧ “F is a normal measure on κ” and M satisfies the following Σ1-
Rowbottom property:
{ξ < κ |M  ϕ(ξ, p)} ∈ FM0 =⇒ ∃τ < α{ξ < κ | JFτ  ϕ(ξ, p)} ∈ FM
for Σ1 formulæ ϕ. Under these conditions it was proved in [15] that Prikry
forcing over M preserves KP. Originally this was used under the hypothesis
that M0 is the least clever mouse, yielding that Mλ[~c] (the forcing extension of
the Q-structure of the λth iterate of M0) is the least admissible set containing ~c
as an element. If M0 is, say, the second clever mouse, then the situation changes
as we would hope.
Lemma 3.21. Let κλ ∈ N ∈ Mλ with N admissible. Let D ∈ N be predense
in N , in the partial order (P)N . Then D is predense in (P)Mλ . Hence ~c is
P-generic over N
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Proof. So let p = 〈p,X〉 ∈ (P)Mλ , and we need to find r ≤ q ∈ D such that
r ≤ p. Now, define the set of extensions of p which extend an element of D:
H = {r ∈ [κr p]<ω | ∃〈q, Yr〉 ∈ D(p ∪ r ⊇ q ∧ p ∪ r \ q ⊆ Yr)}.
This is ∆N1 (D, p), so by admissibility, H ∈ N . By Rowbottom, ∃Z ∈ N ∩ Fλ
such that either [Z]<ω ⊆ H or [Z]<ω ∩ H = ∅. The latter case is impossible
since, considering the condition 〈p, Z〉 ∈ (P)N , by predensity there is r ∈ [Z]<ω
and some Z ′ ⊆ Z such that 〈p∪ r, Z ′〉 extends an element of D. That is to say,
〈p ∪ r, Z ′〉 ≤ 〈q, Yr〉 for some condition 〈q, Yr〉 ∈ D, i.e. r ∈ H.
But now 〈p, Z ∩X〉 is a condition in Mλ such that, for any r ∈ Z ∩X, the
condition r := 〈p∪ r, Z ∩X ∩ Yr〉 ≤ 〈p∪ r, Yr〉 extends a condition in D, so p is
compatible with an element of D, which is what we wanted.
Lemma 3.22. If N in addition is the Q-structure of a clever mouse then
Mλ[~c]  ∃A(A is admissible).
Proof. By the results of [15], Section 3, N [~c] ∈Mλ[~c] is admissible.
Now, if N,M are the least and second-least admissible-in-F structures con-
taining κλ as an element, we want to know that Nλ[~c],Mλ[~c] are similarly min-
imal. For Nλ[~c] this is already known, and for Mλ[~c] it is a minor modification:
Lemma 3.23. If N,M are as in the preceding paragraph then Mλ[~c]  “Nλ[~c]
is the only admissible set N¯ with ~c ∈ N¯”.
Proof. Suppose not, i.e. there is a γ ∈ On ∩Mλ[~c] such that γ > κλ, J~cγ  KP
and Nλ[~c] ∈ J~cγ . Then as in the proof of the corresponding Lemma 3.10 of [15],
JFγ (F the measure on κλ) is Q
N ′
κλ
for some mouse N ′ ∈ HMλκλ . N <∗ N ′ <∗ M ,
so N ′ is therefore not clever as there are no clever mice between N and M .
Then obtain a contradiction with the admissibility of J~cγ as in [15].
Theorem 3.24. If M is as above, there is a closed-unbounded class of Σ1
generating indiscernibles for the theory “T = KP+ there is an admissible set N
with ~c ∈ N .”
Proof. Thus with this theory T , the model AT [~c] is the second-least admissible
set containing ~c.
The proof is exactly the same as the above indiscernibility proofs, relying on
the fact that forcing relation for Σ1 sentences is Σ1 over Mλ, as proved in [15],
and that the iterates are Σ1 elementary.
4. Determinacy from Indiscernibility
Theorems 3.2, 3.19 and 3.24 provide the indiscernibles that are used, via
the usual argument, to prove determinacy in this section. From now on, fix a
pointclass Γ, n ∈ ω and a theory T , and suppose the hypotheses of Theorem
1.2 are satisfied, letting C be the set of generating indiscernibles.
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First of all we need a kind of remarkability for generating indiscernibles. For
~c a set of ordinals, let cm denote the mth ordinal in the increasing enumeration
of ~c.
Lemma 4.1. Suppose:
1. ϕ(x) is a Σn-formula with one free variable and there is a m ∈ ω such that,
for any ~c ∈ [C]ω, ϕ defines an ordinal γ over AT [~c] with cm−1 ≤ γ < cm;
2. ~c, ~d ∈ [C]ω with {i ∈ ω : ci 6= di} finite and ci = di for i < m.
3. AT [~c]  ϕ(γ1) and AT [~d]  ϕ(γ2).
Then γ1 = γ2.
Proof. Without loss of generality suppose that cm < dm. Assume further that
~c and ~d are cardinals and hence limit points of C. Doing so does not affect the
result; if γ1 6= γ2 satisfied the conditions of the Lemma, “spreading out” ~c and
~d does not change this. Let ~e = ~c ∪ ~d. By 2., ei = ci = di for i < m, and ~c, ~d
are definable in AT [~e] (from ~e, which is in our language) by just writing down
the points where ~c and ~d differ, of which there are finitely many.
They are hence ∆0 definable from ~e, and so AT [~c],AT [~d] are Σ1-definable
inner models of AT [~e]. Thus the following is expressible as a Σn-sentence of
AT [~e]:
∃γ1 < cm∃γ2 < dm
(
AT [~c]  ϕ(γ1) ∧ AT [~d]  ϕ(γ2) ∧ γ1 < γ2
)
as is the same sentence but with γ1 > γ2 instead of γ1 < γ2.
So, first suppose that γ1 > γ2, and let ~d′ ∈ [C]ω have the same order
relationship with ~d as ~d does with ~c. Note this is possible because ~c and ~d
consist of limit points of C and hence there is enough room to find such a ~d′
from the remaining elements of C. By indiscernibility we also have γ2 > γ
′
2
where γ′2 is defined in AT [~e] by ϕ(γ′2)AT [~d′]. Hence by picking successive ~dis in
the same way, we end up with a decreasing sequence of ordinals — contradiction.
Now suppose that γ1 < γ2. There are two further sub-cases to consider, the
first being when γ2 < cj for some j. In this case, we can consider successive
~d′, ~d′′, . . . where ~d′, ~d have the same order relations as ~d,~c and so on. Hence γ′2
(defined as before) is greater than γ2. But we can do this greater than cj-many
times as C is a proper class, after which we necessarily have γ
(cj)
2 > cj . But
this is impossible by indiscernibility.
Finally suppose γ2 > ci for all i. This is still expressible as a Σn formula
inside AT [~e] and so this time take successive sequences ~c′ so that sup c′i ap-
proaches di. Thus we can increase ~c′ dn-many times, so that γ2, which is less
than dn, must be less than some c
′
i, which cannot happen by indiscernibility.
Thus the only possibility we are left with is the one we wanted: γ1 = γ2.
We now commence with the proof of Theorem 1.2, following the method
established by Martin for proving determinacy in the Π11 difference hierarchy.
Suppose A ⊆ ωω is ω2 - Π11 + Γ and let 〈Bβ | β < ω2 + 1〉 with Bω2 ∈ Γ witness
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this. Let A = AT [〈ℵn | n < ω〉]. We set up an auxiliary game G∗ as in, for
example, [11]. For x ∈ ωω, let ≺βx be a linear ordering of ω with maximal
element 0, such that ≺βxn depends only on x  n and:
≺βx is a well-ordering if and only if x ∈ Bβ
We know such orderings exist by the general theory of Π11 and we can in fact
make the function x 7→≺βx recursive.
Next let 〈β, n〉 → ξβn be a bijection between ω2 × ω and ω such that:
1. ξβn is even iff β is even;
2. ξβn is increasing in n for fixed β;
3. For natural numbers i and a < b, ξωi+a0 < ξ
ωi+b
0
Note this mapping can also be taken to be recursive.
In the auxiliary game G∗, each move is a pair (ai, ηi) such that ai ∈ ω and
ηi ∈ ℵω:
I 〈a0, η0〉
&&
〈a2, η2〉
&&
· · ·
II 〈a1, η1〉
88
〈a3, η3〉
::
defining an auxiliary game tree, T ∗. The tree is definable in a ∆A0 way, and so
by admissibility is an element of A.
For β < ω2 and a play of this game, x∗ = 〈(ai, ηi) | i ∈ ω〉, define the
function F β : ω → ℵω by:
F β(n) = ηξβn
Then we say that a play of G∗ is badly lost if some Fω·i+b is not an order-
preserving embedding of 〈ω,≺ω·i+bx 〉 into 〈ℵi, <〉. A badly lost position is defined
in the same way. If x∗ is a badly lost play, then there is a shortest badly lost
position p∗ ⊆ x∗ witnessing that some Fω·i+b is not order preserving. We then
say x∗ is badly lost for I if the least such b is even, otherwise it is badly lost for
II, and denote the sets of such plays as BI and BII , respectively.
Then, if x∗ is badly lost for I, II wins, and vice-versa. If x∗ is not badly
lost then I wins if and only if x∗ ∈ Bω2 .
This implicitly defines the winning set of the game G∗, which we denote A∗.
We now use the work of Section 2.2 to calculate the complexity of A∗.
Lemma 4.2. A∗ is Σ˜01 ∧ Π˜01 if n = 1 and Σ˜0n if n > 1 in the space [T ∗].
Proof. A∗ is defined as:
x ∈ A∗ ⇐⇒ x /∈ BI ∧ (x ∈ BII ∨ pi(x) ∈ Aω2)
where pi is the projection function from [T ∗] to ωω:
pi(〈〈a0, η0〉, 〈a1, η1〉, 〈a2, η2〉, . . .〉) = 〈a0, a1, a2, . . .〉.
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Observe that pi is continuous, and in fact the relation p∗ ⊆ pi(x∗) (for p∗ ∈ T ∗,
x∗ ∈ [T ∗]) is generalised semi-recursive. Hence, since Aω2 is Σ˜0n considered as a
subset of [T ∗] by Proposition 2.8, the assertion “pi(x) ∈ Aω2” is Σ˜0n by Lemma
2.7.
Now, BI and BII are Σ˜01: Let ϕ(p) be the formula:
∃b, i (Fω·i+bp is not an order-preserving map from 〈ω,≺ω·i+bp 〉 to ℵi)
∧ the least such b is even.
This is ∆H1 and if ϕ(p) with p ⊆ q then ϕ(q). Then x ∈ BI if and only if
∃m(ϕ(x  m)), so BI is Σ˜01. Similarly for BII . Hence A∗ is Π˜01 ∧ (Σ˜01 ∨ Σ˜0n). If
n = 1 this is Π˜01 ∧ Σ˜01 and if n > 1 then this is Σ˜0n.
Now suppose that, by the hypothesis of Theorem 1.2, σ∗ is a Σn-definable
winning strategy for G∗.
We argue that whichever player has the strategy σ∗ has a winning strategy
for G. The strategy for G is defined by having the player “pretend” their
opponent is playing G∗, using indiscernibility to find that the integer moves
returned by σ∗ are independent of the ordinals they choose to pretend were
played. The auxiliary game is constructed so that the integers played constitute
a winning play in G, so a strategy so defined will also be winning. We prove this
below in the case when II has a winning strategy; the case for I is identical.
When constructing the pretend moves, we will only be considering sequences
where I plays well, i.e. he plays so as not to be badly lost and further:
1. Fωi+2j(n) > Fωi+j
′
(0) for j′ < 2j, i, j ∈ ω;
2. Fωi+2j(n) > ℵi for i, j ∈ ω;
3. Fωi+2j(n) ∈ C for i, j ∈ ω.
We now seek to establish the independence of moves from choice of indis-
cernibles. Suppose 〈η0, . . . , η2n〉 and 〈η′0, . . . , η′2n〉 are two sequences of indis-
cernibles and
p = 〈〈a0, η0〉, . . . , 〈a2n, η2n〉〉, p′ = 〈〈a0, η′0〉, . . . , 〈a2n, η′2n〉
are two positions consistent with σ∗ in which I has played well. We want that
the number components of σ∗(p) and σ∗(p′) agree, and further that the ordinal
components match, subject to certain conditions. To be precise:
Lemma 4.3. With p, p′ as above, if σ∗(p) = 〈a2n+1, η2n+1〉 and σ∗(p′) =
〈a′2n+1, η′2n+1〉 then:
1. a2n+1 = a
′
2n+1
2. If 2n + 1 = ξγr and whenever i ≤ n such that 2i = ξβl , (for l, r ∈ ω and
β < γ) we have that η2i = η
′
2i, then η2n+1 = η
′
2n+1. That is, the ordinal
part of the move σ∗ outputs is not dependent on I’s ordinal moves ηξβr for
β ≥ γ.
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Proof. This is directly analogous to [4], Lemmas 0.8.1, 0.8.2. Let ~κ = 〈κm | m <
ω〉 be the increasing enumeration of {η2i | i ≤ n} ∪ {ℵi | i < ω}, with ~κ′ defined
analogously but with the η′2is. Also let J be the set {j < ω | ∃i(κj = η2i)}, the
indices in the enumeration which are ordinals played by I. Since there have only
been finitely many moves so far, this set is finite. Also, J = {j < ω | ∃i(κ′j =
η′2i)} since I plays well, so all his ordinals must be played into the appropriate
block at the appropriate turn.
Since the ordinal sequences differ only finitely, AT [~κ] and AT [~κ′] have the
same domains as A. In all of these structures, the game G∗ is definable from
the ℵis, and the sequence 〈ℵi | i < ω〉 is definable (uniformly in each structure)
from J , which is finite. Likewise, the set of non-losing positions for II is Π1
over all these structures (we already showed it is Π1 over A), and is the same
set in each.
II’s integer move a2n+1 is just defined by the Σn formula a2n+1 = (σ
∗(p))0
(that is, the first component of the output of σ∗). Further, a′2n+1 is an integer
with the same Σn-definition in AT [~κ′], which is Σn-elementarily equivalent to
AT [~κ], so a2n+1 = a′2n+1.
For the second part we are dealing with ordinals, not integers, and therefore
use the remarkability established in Lemma 4.1. Fix m to be the least number
such that there exists i ≤ n and β > γ with κm = η2i = ηξβl . Note that if such
an η2i does not exist then the result is trivial since all I’s ordinal moves were
the same between p and p′. Now, if j < m then κj = κ′j (by hypothesis) and:
κm−1 ≤ η2n+1 < κm; κ′m−1 ≤ η′2n+1 < κ′m (1)
recalling that 2n + 1 = ξγr . But, together with the Σn-definition of η2n+1 in
AT [~κ] from I’s moves, which are in turn definable from {κj | j ∈ J}. η′2n+1 has
the same Σn-definition in AT [~κ′] from {κ′j | j ∈ J} and so we can apply Lemma
4.1 and η2n+1 = η
′
2n+1.
So we define II’s strategy in G as usual: Suppose we have defined σ(p) for p
of length at most 2n. Then let p = 〈a0, . . . , a2n〉 be a position in G compatible
with σ as defined so far, and suppose we can find p∗ = 〈〈a0, η0〉, . . . , 〈a2n, η2n〉〉,
a position in G∗ consistent with σ∗ where I has played well. Then, set σ(p) =
(σ∗(p))0. That this is well-defined will be shown in the following lemma:
Lemma 4.4. If σ∗ is a winning strategy for II in G∗ from the perspective of
A, then σ is, in V , winning for II in G.
Proof. Let x = 〈a0, a1, . . .〉 be a play in G consistent with σ. If we can show
that for any even γ < ω2, x ∈ ⋂β≤γ Bβ → x ∈ Bγ+1, and that if x ∈ ⋂β<ω2 Bβ
then x ∈ Bω2 , then we will have shown that x /∈ A, which is what we want.
We do this by constructing the ordinals F β(i) in such a way that each F β
is order-preserving. Inductively assume we have defined F β
′
(i) for all i and all
β′ < β, for some β ≤ γ + 1, and we will define the ordinals F β(i).
Start by picking I’s ordinals, i.e. when β is even: For each i < ω and
ξ = supβ′<β F
β′(0), let F β : ω → ℵk+1 (where ω · k ≤ β < ω · k + 1) embed
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≺βx order-preservingly into C ∩ ℵk+1 \ ξ, i.e. let I play well. We know this is
possible because x ∈ Bβ and C is closed and unbounded below ℵk+1.
To pick II’s ordinals, i.e. when β is odd, we use σ∗ inductively. Let p∗ be
the position of length ξβm whose number components come from x and whose
ordinal components are picked as follows: ηi is already defined by induction for
i = ξβ
′
m′ if β
′ < β. Otherwise if i is odd, σ∗ specifies ηi, whilst if it is even
we let ηi be an arbitrary element of C, maintaining that I plays well. This
latter condition can always be met since C is closed and unbounded below each
uncountable cardinal. Now, by Lemma 4.3, σ∗(p∗) is the same regardless of the
arbitrary indiscernibles we choose for I, so is well-defined, and we define ηξβm as
the ordinal component of σ∗(p∗).
We have now defined all ordinals ηβi for β ≤ γ + 1. For β = γ + 1, since
σ∗ is winning in A, this tells us that the function F γ+1 :≺γ+1xk → ℵω given by
i 7→ ηγ+1i is order-preserving for each k; otherwise the shortest x  k where this
was not possible would witness that II lost badly while following σ∗. Since
σ∗ is winning, this cannot happen. Hence ≺γ+1x =
⋃
i∈ω ≺γ+1xi can be mapped
order-preservingly into the ordinals, and x ∈ Bγ+1 as desired.
All that is left is then to show that if x is in all the Bβs up to ω
2, then
x ∈ Bω2 . This is true in A since σ is defined from II’s winning strategy σ∗,
so we just need to know that it is true in V . But the sentence “there exists a
real x consistent with σ in all Bβs except Bω2” is Σ
1
2(σ), and thus by 2.15 is
absolute for A. Hence if σ were not winning in V , it would not be winning in
A, which is a contradiction.
Hence x /∈ A, and σ is winning.
The corresponding proof for I is all but identical, and thus we have proved
Theorem 1.2.
5. Individual Determinacy Proofs
To complete the proof of the main theorem, we need to show that deter-
minacy of the class Γ˜ holds in the models AT [~c], for the relevant theories T .
The class Γ˜ is precisely the class given by Lemma 4.2, and we now prove the
determinacy of each of these classes in the corresponding model, which are the
forcing extensions found in Section 3.
5.1. Det(Σ˜01 ∧ Π˜01)
Lemma 5.1. Let N be admissible with T ∗ ∈ N , and τ be the canonical winning
strategy for II in an open game G(A;T ∗). Then
1. τ is Σ1 ∧Π1-definable over N ; and
2. is still winning in any admissible M 3 N .
Proof. Recall that, if II has a winning strategy in an open game, the canonical
one is given by never playing so as to end up in a ranked position, where the
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rank of a position p is 0 if it is already lost for II (i.e. already in one of the
basic open sets making up the winning set) and otherwise:
rk(p) = µ.ξ(∃a∀b(p̂〈a, b〉 ∈ T ∗ ∧ rk(p̂〈a, b〉) < ξ)).
By the recursion theorem, rk is a ΣKP1 function. τ is then defined by
τ(p) = a↔ a is not ranked ∧ ∀a′ <N a(a is ranked).
“a is ranked” is Σ1 (it is equivalent to ∃ξ rk(a) = ξ) so this is Π1∧Σ1, as desired
for the first claim.
For the second claim, let N ∈ M with the latter admissible. If τ is not
winning in M then some position p consistent with τ must have a game rank
in M but not in N , so suppose p is such a position, with rank least. Then by
definition,
M  ∃a∀b(rk(p̂〈a, b〉) < rk(p)).
But, fixing a, any such p̂〈a, b〉 must thus also have a rank in N , since p is
the rank-minimal position such that p does not have a rank in N . Hence by
admissibility p can be ranked in N as supb rk(p̂〈a, b〉), which is a contradiction.
The following is essentially from [14] but translated into a set-theoretical
form. The original proof uses Π11 comprehension in the Z2 context, and our
hypothesis essentially gives us Π˜11 comprehension for the second admissible above
the game-tree.
Theorem 5.2. Let M be an admissible set with T ∗ ∈M such that
M  ∃M0(Trans(M0) ∧ T ∗ ∈M0 ∧ (KP)M0).
Then any Σ˜01 ∧ Π˜01 game has a winning strategy definable over M by a boolean
combination of Σ1 formulæ. Hence a further admissible set containing M will
contain the winning strategy as an element.
Proof. Let A be Σ˜01 and B be Π˜
0
1, and fix the game G where player I is trying to
get into A ∩B. Now a winning strategy for the game with winning set A (and
likewise for B) is definable over the admissible M0 via a game-rank argument,
but depending on who wins, is not necessarily a member.
For p ∈ T ∗, dT ∗p e is the open neighbourhood of p. Suppose player I has no
winning strategy to play into A ∩B, and define the set z ⊆ T ∗:
z = {p ∈ T ∗ | |p| is even ∧ dT ∗p e ⊆ A ∧ ∃σ(σ is a w-s for I into B ∩ dT ∗p e)}.
z is thus a Σ˜11 generalised real and an element of M by the generalised Spector-
Gandy theorem. The class of extensions of elements of z is Σ˜01(z) and thus has
a winning strategy Π1 ∧ Σ1-definable over M since z ∈M . In fact the strategy
must be for II, since a winning play for I would also be in A∩B, and I has no
winning strategy there, by assumption. Call II’s strategy τ0.
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Define
y = {p ∈ T ∗ | |p| is even ∧ dT ∗p e ⊆ A ∧ p /∈ z}.
So if p ∈ y then by open determinacy, II has a winning strategy to play out of
B ∩ dT ∗p e. Let τp be this strategy for each such p. Such strategies are definable
over M0, thus ∆1-definable elements of M and so p 7→ τp is a ΣM1 function by
admissibility.
Then we define a winning strategy τ∗ for II by setting τ∗(p) = τ0(p) when-
ever dT ∗p e 6⊆ A, and τ∗(p̂r) = τp(r) when p is the shortest position such that
dT ∗p e ⊆ A. Thus if τ0 leads II to a position p which will end up in A, she
switches to τp which will keep her out of B forever, thus winning. Since τ0 and
τp are definable over M , so is τ .
τ(p) =
{
τ0(p) if dT ∗p e 6⊆ A;
τq(p) otherwise, where q ⊆ p is shortest such that dT ∗q e ⊆ A.
This is definable over M by a boolean combination of Σ1 formulæ. If N is an
admissible set with M ∈ N then τ0, τp will be in N , and still be winning for
their respective subgames. Hence τ ∈ N and is also winning.
Thus, since starting with the second-least clever mouse yields generating
indiscernibles for such structures M , Theorem 1.2 applies, and we have proved
Theorem 1.1 part 1.
5.2. Det(Σ˜02)
We show that if A is Σ˜02 then G(A;T
∗) is determined in transitive models of
KP1. Let T be KP1, then let AT [~c] be the least transitive model of T containing
~c as an element, where we assume {ℵi | i ∈ ω} ⊆ ~c. Being a model of KP1
implies that there are admissibles Ni such that:
N1 ≺Σ1 N2 ≺Σ1 . . . ≺Σ1 AT [~c].
Being a minimal transitive model implies that AT [~c] has a parameterless Σ1
Skolem function.
The determinacy proof is just the same as usual, first proved by Wolfe in
[17], and also found in [9] as Theorem 1.3.3., but we have to pay attention to
how much separation and replacement we’re using. For convenience, fix A to
be AT [~c] for some arbitrary ~c (for example, the sequence of ℵis).
We first need to know the complexities of some standard concepts. Most
importantly, “being a winning strategy” is ∆1 in a limit of admissibles:
Lemma 5.3. The sentence “σ is a winning strategy for G(A;T ∗)” (for I, II
or either player) is ∆1 over any admissible M satisfying:
1. T ∗ ∈M ;
2. ∃N ∈M(N is admissible and σ ∈ N)
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Hence the sentence “there exists a winning strategy for G(A;T ∗)” (for I, II or
either player) is Σ1 over A.
Proof. Let σ ∈ N ∈M , with N,M admissible. Then certainly being winning is
expressible by the Π1 formula:
∀x(x ∈ dT ∗e → σ ∗ x ∈ A).
Note that checking x ∈ A for a generalised-arithmetic A is ∆1 over M since it
is definable over H.
Now we just need a Σ1 formula. But note that the set {x | x ∗ σ ∈ A} is Σ˜11
and so by Theorem 2.14, if non-empty, has an element definable over N , and
hence in M , witnessing that σ is not winning. Thus if M is as required, the
following sentence will do:
∃N(Trans(N) ∧N  KP ∧ T ∗ ∈ N ∧ ∀x ∈ dT ∗e ∩Def(N)(σ ∗ x ∈ A)).
Again, everything inside the scope of the quantifier is ∆1, so we are done with
the first assertion of the lemma. The second assertion then follows trivially.
Now let’s examine quasi-strategies:
Lemma 5.4. If G(A;T ∗) is not a win for I, then II’s non-losing quasi-strategy
is a Π1 definable element of A.
Proof. “not being a win for I” is a ΠA1 property by the previous lemma, and in
this case, II’s non-losing quasi-strategy is ΠA1 :
T ′ := {p ∈ T ∗ | ∀n ≤ |p|(G(A;T ∗pn) is not a win for I)}.
Being Π1, T
′ is ∆0 definable from its Σ1 complement in T ∗. Thus by Σ1-
Separation, T ′ is an element of A.
We now proceed with Wolfe’s proof, starting with the following Lemma:
Lemma 5.5. Let B ⊆ A with B ∈ Π˜01 and A a generalised-arithmetic class of
A. If I has no winning strategy for G(A;T ∗), then in A there is a strategy τ
for II such that for any play x ∈ dτe, x extends a position p such that:
1. dT ∗p e ∩B = ∅;
2. G(A;T ∗p ) has no winning strategy for I.
Proof. Define C to be the set of plays such that no initial move satisfies both
the assertions of the lemma, that is:
C := {x ∈ dT e∗ | ∀p ⊆ x(dT ∗p e ∩B 6= ∅ ∨G(A;T ∗p ) is a win for I)}.
Being a win for I is Σ1 and the rest of the definition here is ∆0, so C is Σ1-
definable over A. To prove the lemma we just need a winning strategy for
II in the game G(C;T ∗), so suppose there isn’t one. But C is closed; it is
the complement of the union of basic open sets and so I must have a winning
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strategy, σ. Now, since G(A;T ∗) is not a win for I, by the previous lemma II’s
non-losing quasi-strategy T ′ is a ΠA1 element of A. Hence I has no winning
strategy in G(A;T ′). But since T ′ doesn’t restrict I’s moves, σ restricted to T ′
is still a winning strategy for G(C;T ′).
Denote σ’s restriction to T ′ by σ′, and let x be any play consistent with σ′.
Then for every p ∈ T ′, and hence for any p ⊆ x, the game G(A;T ∗p ) is not a
win for I since T ′ is II’s non-losing quasi-strategy. Hence we have shown that
the second condition above holds for every p ⊆ x. Since we assumed that not
both are true, then, every p ⊆ x satisfies dT ∗p e ∩B 6= ∅. But B is closed so this
means it contains x. Hence x ∈ B ⊆ A, but x was an arbitrary play consistent
with σ′, so σ′ is winning for G(A;T ′), which is a contradiction.
The proof of the theorem now follows quite simply.
Theorem 5.6. A  Det(Σ˜02).
Proof. Let A ∈ Σ˜02, so that A =
⋃
i∈ω Ai for closed Ai. Suppose G(A;T
∗) is
not a win for I, and we will construct a winning strategy τ for II. The familiar
idea is to build τ from countably many τi, each given by applying the lemma
with B set to Ai.
Let τ0 be the strategy given by the previous lemma for B = A0, and let
p0 be the shortest position consistent with τ0 and q
I satisfying both conditions
stated in the lemma. We then simultaneously define pi and τi by induction, for
as long as pi is shorter than 2n.
Firstly:
S(T ∗p ) =
the least strategy τ that wins G(C;T ∗p ), with
C as defined in the previous lemma.
P (τi, q
I) =
the shortest position p ⊆ τi∗qI satisfying both
conditions of the previous lemma.
(Here we interpret τi ∗ qI for the finite sequence qI as being all plays compatible
with τi where I played from q
I his first n moves.) Then, if we have defined all
strategies and positions up to τi, pi:
τi+1(p) =
{
τi(p) if p ⊆ pi
S(T ∗pi) otherwise
pi+1 = P (τi+1, q
I).
Note that pi+1 (and hence τi+2) will be undefined if the lemma would produce
a position longer than 2n.
Let τ(∅) = τ0(∅). We define a winning strategy for II by recursion on
length of position.
Suppose we have defined τ on all positions of length up to 2n, and let q be a
position of length 2n+ 1 compatible with τ . Let qI = 〈q0, q2, . . . , q2n〉, and use
it to define τi and pi as above, with k least such that pk is undefined. Then we
define τ(q) = τk(q). Note that S and P are Σ1 and ∆0 over A, respectively, so
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this amounts to a Σ1 recursion, giving τ a Σ1-definable element of A, so it just
remains to show that τ is winning.
So let x be consistent with τ , so that we have positions pi ⊆ x for all i ∈ ω,
with dT ∗pie ∩ Ai = ∅. Hence x ∈ dT ∗pie for each i, and so x /∈
⋃
i∈ω Ai = A, so
II wins, and τ is winning.
This gives us that, if I does not have a winning strategy in A, II does, and
in fact it is Σ1 definable. If I does have the winning strategy, we can in fact
find a Σ1 definable one because, by Lemma 5.3, “being a winning strategy” is
∆1 definable over A and thus the A-least such strategy is ΣA1 .
Thus we have proved Theorem 1.1 part 2.
5.3. Det(Σ˜03)
Let T be the theory KP+Σ2 - Sep, and AT [~c] the least transitive model of T
containing ~c as an element. For simplicity of notation let A be AT [~c] for some ~c
including {ℵi | i ∈ ω}. The game tree T ∗ is a ∆0 element of A. It is a standard
fact that models of KP+ Σ2 -Sep are limits of admissibles and more, so being a
winning strategy is a ∆A1 predicate, and the non-losing quasi-strategy is Π
A
1 .
Let A be a Σ˜03 subset of dT ∗e, and we will want to show that A  “G(A;T ∗)
is determined.” We follow the specialised version of Davis’ original proof as laid
out in [16]. This in turn uses Martin’s version, as in [9], of the proof closely,
but explicitly minimising the required strength. We note that Σ2 -Sep is more
than is necessary to effect this proof, so our proof is simpler than that in [16].
As with Martin’s proof, we start with a lemma that is applied repeatedly
to build up a strategy to prove the theorem. We will have to ensure that the
objects defined are elements of the structure A, and must allow for the added
complexity coming from the use of the generalised pointclass Σ˜03.
Lemma 5.7. Let B ⊆ A be Π˜02 and T a game subtree of T ∗. Suppose I has no
winning strategy in G(A;T ), then II has a quasi-strategy T¯ such that:
1. dT¯ e ∩B = ∅;
2. G(A; T¯ ) is not a win for I.
Proof. Let T ′ be II’s non-losing quasi-strategy, which is a Π1-definable set in
A. Define a position p to be good if there is a quasi-strategy T¯ ⊆ T ′p satisfying
the above two properties. Goodness is a Σ2 property, asserting the existence of
a tree with properties 1. and 2., with 1. being ∆1 and 2. being Π1. The set of
good positions H is therefore an element of A.
Denote by Tˆ the function with domain H, defined over A as: Tˆ (p) is the least
quasi-strategy witnessing that p is good. This is Σ2 definable by the existence
of Σ2 Skolem functions.
Let B =
⋂
nDn, with each Dn ∈ Σ˜01, and define the sets:
En = A ∪ {x ∈ dT ′e | ∃p ⊆ x(dT ′pe ⊆ Dn ∧ p is not good)}.
Thus each En is a Π2 set in A once we make the ∃p bounded in the usual way.
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The goal, then, is to prove that the initial position ∅ is good. This will
be accomplished by showing that there is at least one En for which I has no
winning strategy in T ′. Following Martin, we first show that this does what we
want, so assume that there is no winning strategy for I in the game G(En;T
′)
in A. Let T ′′ be II’s non-losing quasi-strategy in this game.
We now define a quasi-strategy T¯ . T¯ firstly contains all p ∈ T ′′ until dT ′pe 6⊆
Dn. Then letting p be a minimal position such that dT ′pe ⊆ Dn, note that p
must be good. This is because, if p were bad the definition of En implies I has a
trivial winning strategy in G(En;T
′
p). But p is supposed to be in II’s non-losing
quasi-strategy, and hence upon reaching such a p we can include Tˆ (p) into T¯ .
Now we wish to show that T¯ is a witness in A to the initial position being
good. Note firstly that dT¯ e ∩ B = ∅, because either a play through T¯ remains
in T ′′ (and so it is not in Dn, hence not in B) or it goes through Tˆ (p) which
witnesses p’s goodness, hence avoiding B.
We now need to show that G(A; T¯ ) is not a win for I, so suppose otherwise
and let σ ∈ A witness that. Every position p consistent with σ satisfies dT ′pe 6⊆
Dn: if not, then there is such a p with T¯p = Tˆ (p). But Tˆ (p) is a witness to p’s
goodness in A, so G(A; T¯p) is not a win for I in A.
By the definition of T¯ , then, all plays consistent with σ lie in dT ′′e. Hence
σ is also a winning strategy for G(A;T ′′) and, since A ⊆ En, for G(En;T ′′).
But this allows us the contradiction we want: Define a strategy τ for I in
G(En;T
′) by following σ until possibly reaching a point p /∈ T ′′. Then there is a
strategy σp winning for I in A (since T ′ is non-losing in A), so let τ follow this
strategy. This procedure is definable from σ and the strategies σp, all of which
are elements of A, and thus the strategy is in A for the desired contradiction.
We have now shown that, under the assumption that at least one game
G(En;T
′) is not a win for I, we have that ∅ is good as desired, and we need
to show that this assumption is valid. Note that the above argument can be
adapted to show that, if G(Epn;T
′
p) is not a win for I, where:
Epn := A ∪ {x ∈ dT ′pe | ∃q ⊆ x(p ⊆ q ∧ dT ′qe ⊆ Dn ∧ q is not good)}
then p is good. Hence suppose the lemma is false. We can thus assume that each
G(Epn;T
′
p) is a win for I (in A) since this is the only case in which we haven’t
proved the lemma. We then show that I has a winning strategy in G(A;T ′) in
A, contradicting the hypothesis of the lemma.
I starts by playing with the strategy from the previous lemma for G(E0;T
′).
If we never reach a point p1 with dT ′p1e ⊆ D0 then, if the play ends up in E0
it must be in A. Otherwise all plays above p1 are in D0, and I now must start
playing according to the strategy for G(Ep11 ;T
′
p1). We now either end up in
A or use the strategy for G(Ep22 ;T
′
p2). If this process terminates, then I has a
winning strategy for some G(Epii ;T
′
pi) and the only way for I to win in the game
would be to get into A, giving a winning strategy in G(A;T ′). If the process
continues indefinitely, then I has landed in each Dn and hence is in B ⊆ A.
It remains to show that the strategy thus defined is an element of A, so let’s
make our definitions above precise. Suppose q is an even-length position with
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q ⊇ pi, and that we have defined pi and σi, but not pi+1 and σi+1.
σ(q) =
{
σi(q) if dT ′qe 6⊆ Di
σi+1(q) otherwise
where, if “otherwise,” we set:
σi+1 = I’s least winning strategy in G(E
q
i ;T
′
q).
Thus σ is defined by a recursion on ω and is an element of A. But T ′ is I’s
non-losing quasi-strategy in A and so this is a contradiction.
Theorem 5.8. For any Σ˜03 subset A of dT ∗e, A  “G(A;T ∗) is determined”.
Proof. Now we are ready to prove the theorem. Let A =
⋃
n∈ω An, with each
An Π˜
0
2, and suppose G(A;T
∗) is not a win for I, and we show that II has a win-
ning strategy definable by a Σ2-recursion over A which, by Σ2-admissibility is
therefore an element of A. We apply the previous lemma repeatedly, substitut-
ing each An as an instance of B, and the resulting quasi-strategies as instances
of T .
First apply the Lemma with B = A0 and T
∗, yielding a quasi-strategy
T¯ ∗ ∈ A, which we shall now call T∅. Taking T∅ to be the least such gives T∅
a Σ2 element of A.
The lemma tells us that G(A;T∅) is not a win for I, so for any length-1
position p1 ∈ T ∗, let τ(p1) be some arbitrary, fixed move in II’s non-losing
quasi-strategy. Now let p2 be a length-2 move consistent with τ as defined so
far and apply the Lemma with B = A1 and T = (T
∅)p2 , yielding a quasi-
strategy which we call T p2 , Σ2-definable from (T
∅)p2 and hence an element of
A. Since the Lemma guarantees I still has no winning strategy in G(A;T ∗p2),
for an arbitrary length-3 position p3, let τ(p3) be an arbitrary move consistent
with II’s non-losing quasi-strategy there.
Continuing in this way defines a strategy τ for II by Σ2-recursion, and as
noted above, this gives τ ∈ A. All that remains is to show that τ is winning. If x
is consistent with τ then by construction it is in each dT p2ne, and dT p2ne∩Bn =
∅ by the lemma, so ∀n ∈ ω(x /∈ Bn), so x /∈ A and is a win for II.
Thus we have proved Theorem 1.1 part 3.
5.4. Det(n - Π˜03)
To prove this, we refer to the work of Montalba´n and Shore, [12], Section
4, which in turn is a version of Martin’s proof in Section 1.4 of [9]. Since that
proof is long, needs very little modification and we have already seen how the
arguments transfer from the ordinary case to determinacy of these auxiliary
games, we will be brief.
Working in a minimal model A with T ∗ ∈ A and satisfying KPn+1, we have
to ensure that all the objects defined in the proof of [12] exist in A.
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First, let A be as follows:
A is m - Π˜03 as witnessed by 〈Ai | i ≤ m〉, a descending sequence of Π˜03 sets;
Ai =
⋂
j∈ω
Ai,j for Σ˜
0
2 sets Ai,j ;
Ai,j =
⋃
k∈ω
Ai,j,k for Π˜
0
1 sets Ai,j,k.
Let s be a position in T ∗ of length at most m, and S a subtree of T ∗. Let
l = m − |s| and fix player x to be I if l is even and II otherwise, with x¯ the
opposite player. Then let Bx be B if x = I and Bc otherwise, for any set B
(taking complementation inside the ambient space, which is dT ∗e in the case of
Ax, but when considering the winning set of a game in the tree S, it is in dSe).
We define the predicates P s(S) by recursion up to m, exactly as in [12]:
Definition 5.9.
P∅(S) holds iff there is a winning strategy for player x in G(A;S).
P s(S) holds for |s| = n + 1 iff there is a quasistrategy U ⊆ S for player x
such that
1. dUe ⊆ Ax ∪A(m−n−1),s(n); and
2. P sn(U) fails.
Definition 5.10.
A quasistrategy U witnesses that P s(S) if it is as required in Definition 5.9.
A quasistrategy U locally witnesses that P s(S) if either s = ∅ and U is a
witness to P∅(S), or |s| > 0, U is a quasistrategy for player x and there is a
D ⊆ S such that for every position d ∈ D, there is a quasistrategy Rd ⊆ Sd for
x¯ such that:
1. ∀d ∈ D ∩ U(Ud ∩Rd witnesses that P s(Rd))
2. dUe \⋃d∈DdRde ⊆ Ax
3. For a position p ∈ S there is at most one position d ∈ D such that
d ⊆ p ∧ p ∈ Rd.
These are technical conditions that are used in the proof to ultimately ensure
determinacy. Many sets are defined using these conditions, so we will need to
know the complexity, and thus that the sets are elements of A.
Proposition 5.11.
1. P s(S) is Σ|s|+1
2. “U witnesses that P s(S) holds” is Π|s|
3. “U locally witnesses that P s(S) holds” is Σ|s|+1.
Proof. Since “there is a winning strategy for x in G(A;S)” is Σ1 over A (recall
Lemma 5.3), P∅(S) is Σ1. Then if |s| = n+ 1, the definition requires checking
that there is a U such that ¬P sn(U), so inductively the predicate overall is
Σ|s|+1.
The complexities of the other predicates follow straightforwardly as well.
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Contrast this with Remark 4.3 of [12], where the same concepts are noted
to be Σ1|s|+2, Π
1
|s|+1 and Σ
1
|s|+2, respectively; the Kleene-Basis theorem allows
us to eliminate a quantifier in the base case.
With this observation, the remainder of Montalba´n and Shore’s proof can
be followed in A. Note that, whenever we define a set (of plays, or of positions)
it is, in their proof, at most Σ1n+2 using their Remark 4.3. Consequently by our
Proposition 5.11 the same sets are at most Σ1n+1, indeed whenever their set is
Σm+1, ours is Σm. When it comes to define a function returning such sets, we
use the fact that the A-least set satisfying a Σm property is again Σm.
Following their proof with these minor modifications, then, gives us:
Theorem 5.12. A  Det(n - Π˜03).
So we have proved Theorem 1.1, part 4.
5.5. Det(Σ˜0α)
For the final part of Theorem 1.1 we need to make a minor modification to
the picture; Section 2.2 and Lemma 4.2 only deal with sets of finite Borel rank.
We will first deal with the simpler case of part 6 of the main theorem, so let
A be some AZFC[~c], with ~c ⊇ {ℵi | i ∈ ω}.
Definition 5.13. Fix some ∆H1 encoding p : ℵω → T ∗ and let A ⊆ dT ∗e.
1. A is Σ˜01 iff there is a partial Σ1(H) function e : ℵω → ℵω where A =⋃
αdT ∗p(e(α))e. The code for A is then 〈0, e〉, having coded e as an element
of ℵω. This is possible because there are only ℵω-many such functions
that are Σ1(H) definable with parameters from H.
2. A is Σ˜0α iff there is a partial Σ1(H) function e : ω → ℵω such that e(a) is
a code for a Π˜0β set for some β < α and A =
⋃
a e(a). The code for A is
then 〈1, e〉.
3. A is Π˜0α iff there is a Σ˜
0
α set such that A = B
c. If B has code c then the
code for A is 〈2, c〉.
Theorem 5.14. For α < ω, this definition of Σ˜0α agrees with the old definition.
Proof. It is clear that the two definitions of Σ˜01 are equivalent: if we know the
Σ1 set X of the original definition, then setting e(α) = α ⇐⇒ p(α) ∈ X and
leaving e undefined otherwise, we have that e is Σ1(H) and the sets defined are
the same. If we know e, and e(α) = β, put p(β) ∈ X.
Now assume that we have shown the two definitions of Σ˜0n agree. Then if
A = {x∗ | ∃aR(x∗, a)} for some Π˜0n predicate R, we take e(a) to be (the code
for) {x∗ | R(x∗, a)} and A = ⋃a e(a). Noting that obtaining the codes for
R(·, a) is ∆H1 , we have that e is a ∆H1 map, satisfying the requirements for the
new definition.
On the other hand if A =
⋃
a e(a) is Σ˜
0
n+1 with the above definition we may
assume that the relation R(x∗, a) given by x∗ ∈ e(a) is Π˜0n, and set x∗ ∈ A ⇐⇒
∃a(R(x∗, a)).
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Thus if we fix A∗ ⊆ [T ∗] to be Σ˜0α, we have A∗ ∈ A. Furthermore, by the
way it is defined, such sets are all within Σ0α. Hence by the Borel Determinacy
Theorem, A  Det(Σ˜0α). By slightly altering Lemma 4.2 we can see that, if
A ∈ Σ0α then the corresponding winning set for the auxiliary game is Σ˜0α, and
then the rest of the machinery of Theorem 1.2 works as before.
For part 5 of the main theorem we just need to modify things slightly in
light of Martin’s level-by-level analysis of the determinacy of the Borel sets:
Theorem 5.15 ([9], 2.3.5). Let M be a model of ZC− + Σ1 -Replacement, and
suppose Pα(T ) ∈ M . Then, if α is finite, M “all ∆0α+4 games in T are
determined”. If α is an infinite countable ordinal of M then M “all ∆0α+3
games are determined”.
(Note that here we mean ∆0α in the sense of M , so while this may not be all
of the true ∆0α sets we know that in our situation, with M transitive, it will be
all of the ∆˜0α sets.)
Thus we will want A to be a model of ZC− + Σ1 -Replacement + Pα(T ∗)
exists (where T ∗ is the auxiliary game tree, (ω × ℵω)<ω).
Now consider the argument again, starting with a model M with measurable
cardinal κ, of ZFC− + Pα(κ) exists. We iterate this model as in Section 3 to
obtain Mλ, which is elementarily equivalent to M , and then force to produce
models A[~c]. By elementarity, Mλ  ZFC−+Pα(κλ) exists, and so by the usual
argument for showing that the Power Set axiom holds in generic extensions, so
does Mλ[~c]. Thus all the models A[~c] = Mλ[~c] which we use in the arguments
of Section 4 see that Pα(T ∗) exists, since in that case κλ = ℵω, hence the
hypotheses of Theorem 5.15 are satisfied when it comes to proving determinacy
of the auxiliary game.
We have thus completed the proof Theorem 1.1.
6. Conclusions and Open Questions
The main result shows the adaptability of the technique originally invented
by Martin for proving determinacy results on α - Π11. The basic results of Section
2.1 show that we automatically get the determinacy of ω2 - Π11 + Π
0
2 from KP1
(and so on) as we would expect. In this way we have established new upper-
bounds on the consistency strength of determinacy of classes strictly between
ω2 - Π11 and (ω
2 + 1) - Π11.
Open questions are of two kinds; the first is whether the hypotheses used
here are minimal and the second is what hypotheses can we find that prove the
determinacy of similar pointclasses. To the second question, we have essentially
exhausted the possibilities for extending ω2 - Π11 by one more set, but we could
investigate the modifications to the difference hierarchy in [4] to see if more
results are provable.
To the first question, we should not expect optimality in parts 1–3 of 1.1,
since for those we either know that the determinacy proof holds in models weaker
than the forcing extensions we consider, or have no reason to suspect otherwise.
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The problem is that we cannot preserve arbitrary theories when iterating and
doing the forcing in Section 3, so even where we have optimal determinacy
results (for instance, it is known that Det(Σ02) is equivalent to closure under
Σ11-monotone inductive definitions) we cannot necessarily transfer them.
In the case of part 4, Montalba´n and Shore show in [12] that we cannot even
find an exact characterisation of Determinacy down in the Borel hierarchy, so
we should not hope to find any in the refined difference hierarchy. However, we
may rather hope to prove, as they did, that no exact correspondence can be
found.
On the other hand we know that Borel determinacy requires almost the full
strength of ZFC, with Martin’s analysis showing that we should expect parts 5
and 6 to be nearly optimal.
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